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The purposes of this paper are:
to provide an overview of the scope of emergency relief opera­
tions for refugees;
to divide an emergency into easily-recognized phases and sub­
components ;
to examine how one phase leads into another;
to see how actions in one phase can set the stage for subsequent 
actions or activities in the next;
to identify the operational sectors (health, logistics, etc.), 
professions and occupational specialities that are required to 
provide adequate assistance;
to identify the emergency management skills that need to be 
developed for effective emergency management; and
to identify common gaps in the service coverage and typical 
problems that must be dealt with in an emergency operation.
INTRODUCTION
There are differing types of refugee emergencies. While many can be 
life-threatening, the most important from an operational viewpoint is the
mass influx -- the sudden arrival of thousands of people seeking safety
by crossing an international border. In these situations, the people have 
often been under armed attack and may bring their wounded with them. In 
many cases, the people have been without adequate food and water for some 
time and are undernourished and dehydrated. Sometimes, the refugees may 
have been exposed to (or carry) communicable diseases which, without 
proper immunization, could reach epidemic proportions.
It is here, in the response to a mass influx situation, that the 
international relief system often fails. In fact, the reasons are 
systemic, i.e., they are a result of the failure of the system as a whole 
rather than of the organizations that make up the system. Yet, many 
improvements are possible. By examining past operations more closely, 
recurring problems and patterns can be identified and specific approaches 
for meeting them can be developed.
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In studying refugee emergency operations, it is important to consider 
several factors:
the relationship of various assistance activities to the appro­
priate phase of a disaster. All emergencies can be divided into 
distinct phases. The length of any one phase can vary greatly, 
depending on the cause of the emergency and other factors. It is 
important to recognize the different phases and know what activi­
ties are appropriate to each. For example, in the initial phase 
of an emergency, it is usually necessary to distribute free food 
and other relief supplies. But if this activity is carried out 
in later phases when self-reliant activities could be promoted, 
there is a danger that dependencies may be fostered.
--  the relationship of various time phases to each other. The
phases of a mass influx can be depicted graphically as a con­
tinuum, as shown in Figure 1 below. By understanding the 
sequence of these phases, it is possible to delineate the actions 
that can be carried out in each.
Figure 1: Refugee Operations Continuum
how activities in one phase can set the stage for the next. 
Referring to Figures 1 and 2, it is possible to see how activi­
ties in one phase relate to the preceding and following phases. 
For example, emergency response can be facilitated if operational 
plans and programs have been developed prior to the emergency, 
not during it. As a general rule, each phase and each activity 
lays the foundation and sets the stage for activities in the next 
phase. Therefore, when planning an emergency response, the 
emergency manager should keep in mind how that activity can pro­




Emergency management encompasses the entire field of emergency assis­
tance and protection for refugees (and displaced persons). The refugee 
field of disaster management is highly-specialized and requires not only 
many .development skills, but also a broader awareness of political, legal 
and humanitarian issues.
The objectives of emergency management are:
"to reduce the human, physical and economic losses suffered by 
individuals and society as a result of armed conflicts or civil 
strife;
--  to provide protection, and to support and facilitate protection
activities;
--  to reduce human suffering and psychological trauma;
--  to lay a groundwork for finding a durable solution to the
refugees’ plight, and
i-° reduce the adverse impact on the host country and especially 
the nearest communities.
When assisting refugees or displaced persons, the objective of provid­
ing protection cannot be divorced from general relief. In this paper, 
protection is defined as "intervention by governments, international 
organizations, or private relief organizations to protect persons 
threatened by armed conflict”. Intervention may include provision of 
sanctuary or a means of escape from conflict, and emergency support to 
victims threatened by disease, starvation and exposure to the environ­
mental elements while they are refugees or displaced persons. (This 
definition is broader than the usual interpretation by the United Nations 
and International Committee of the Red Cross.)
PHASES OF AN EMERGENCY
A refugee emergency can be divided into many phases. Generally each 
phase is distinct and can be recognized from the types of activities that 
are being carried out at the field level. However, the point at which one 
phase ends and another begins is often difficult to define; indeed, in 
most cases there is substantial overlap as one blends into the next. The 
following is a description of the principal phases according to the types 
of activities that are carried out in each stage of the emergency manage­
ment process.
A. Preparedness
"Preparedness" is defined as the actions taken by individuals and 
organizations to prepare for any emergency situation. Preparedness is the 
responsibility of everyone in an humanitarian or relief organization. In 
order for an organization to respond properly, everyone must be prepared, 
trained and have the tools necessary to carry out the job.
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In large organizations, preparedness is usually carried out under the 
direction of an emergency preparedness unit; in smaller groups, it is 
usually carried out by a person designated as the "emergency preparedness 
officer".
The scope of emergency preparedness is fairly broad. It includes 
developing contingency plans, developing organizational systems, stock­
piling supplies, training, and working with staff to monitor and recognize 
the signs of an impending crisis. Evaluation of emergency programs is 
also a key activity, for only by documenting the lessons learned can the 
overall system be improved.
Monitoring is another key preparedness function. "Monitoring” in this 
instance may be defined as the normal watch over events in countries 
likely to generate refugees. The primary responsibility for monitoring 
lies with the field offices in both the country of origin and the possible 
country of asylum. Organizations should share information about current 
events and their potential for creating an outflow of asylum-seekers.
B. Early Warning
' Early warning" is the identification, interpretation and recognition 
of events that would indicate a potential emergency.
Responsibility for establishing an early warning system, monitoring 
events and reacting again lies with the field offices in both the country 
of origin and the possible country of asylum. In large organizations, 
desk officers at headquarters should provide a bridge for sharing informa­
tion between the two field offices.
The scope of early warning is fairly broad. It is essentially the 
task of collecting data from many sources, interpreting it, and attempting 
to identify indicators of problems and patterns that forewarn of develop­
ing crises. Based on an interpretation of these events, planners must 
forecast possible scenarios about the flow of people, where they might go 
and at what point they might cross a border. As a situation escalates, 
counterparts and operating partners should be notified and information 
freely exchanged so that the process of planning for an emergency response 
can begin.
C. Forward Planning
Forward planning", sometimes called contingency planning, can be 
defined as the actions taken to prepare for an impending emergency. When 
it becomes obvious that an emergency is likely to occur, preliminary steps 
must be taken to mobilize the organization and its counterparts to react 
and to take concrete steps in preparation for the emergency.
The field office takes the lead in developing emergency response 
plans. At the same time, it is necessary for the entire organization to 
mobilize. Procurement, finance, intergovernmental relations, protection 
—  everyone should be involved.
The scope of forward planning is fairly broad, for it covers the prime 
sectors: food, health, water, sanitation, logistics and physical planning.
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While a number of sectors and activities are wide-ranging, they should be 
limited by adherence to an emergency response doctrine which defines what 
the organization will do in the initial stages of an emergency.
The other primary activity in forward planning is accelerated informa­
tion gathering, not only about the persons who are likely to come into the 
relief system but also about the host community and the resources avail­
able in-country to support the refugees.
The main actors in forward planning are the host government, the 
UNHCR, the World Food Program, the ICRC and the NGOs that will provide 
services to the refugees once they have arrived.
Forward planning begins when certain thresholds have been crossed, for 
example, when displaced persons moving toward a border move within a cer­
tain distance from a likely crossing point. At that point, funds are 
committed and, in effect, emergency response begins.
D. Emergency Response
An emergency may start with a sudden bang, e .g ., several thousand 
refugees crossing the border with minimal notice. In most cases, however, 
an emergency builds up over a period of weeks or months and may only 
become acute as the result of unforeseen factors.
"Emergency response" may be defined as the immediate extraordinary 
actions taken to aid refugees. Assistance is normally provided under 
special procedures and guidelines established by the assisting organiza­
tions and guided by international practices. There are major weaknesses, 
however. While international protection is guaranteed under the Geneva 
Conventions and other international accords, basic standards for services
lifesaving interventions have been neglected and, as a result, most 
emergency responses begin in rather haphazard and slipshod fashion.
In order to respond with appropriate assistance in a quick and effec­
tive manner, two major sets of activities must be carried out: assessment
and a "set piece" response.
1* Assessment. The term "emergency assessment" refers to the survey
and information-collection activities carried out to determine 
the status of a refugee emergency, the condition of the refugees, 
the adequacy of the services being provided and the conditions of 
the sites where they are being placed.
Emergency assessment takes over where information-gathering 
during forward planning leaves off. The main difference is that 
the primary source of information is the refugees themselves.
Emergency assessment is a key function. The techniques used to 
evaluate operations will be used time and time again to re­
evaluate the situation, to monitor various systems and to adjust 
overall program management.
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The most important aspect of the initial assessment is provision 
of sufficient information for planning and adjusting the emer­
gency response. Research has to be thorough, yet rapid; thus, 
the assessment team must be knowledgable and thoroughly prepared 
to carry out the assessment by identifying indicators and 
patterns of problems that can lead to conclusions about the 
overall situation.
An emergency assessment must involve the local government, the UN 
system and the NGOs operating in the field. By sharing responsi­
bility for the assessment, the inherent need of organizations to 
do their own assessments can be reduced. If detailed data is 
developed, the credibility of the assessment will be assured.
When only sketchy information is derived, responses may be off- 
target and urgent actions delayed while further assessments are 
undertaken.
2. Initial interventions. The initial response to every emergency 
should follow a set pattern based on the assumption that certain 
problems will most likely be present. This set response should 
continue until assessments and other information prove other­
wise.
"Initial response" may be defined as the first steps taken to 
establish an emergency relief program. At the outset, actions 
are based on an epidemiological understanding of what causes 
death among refugees: malnutrition, communicable disease,
diarrhea and dehydration. The priority activities —  provision 
of food, immunization, and clean water supply —  are preventive 
in nature. Most can be carried out without highly-trained tech­
nicians and are limited in scope and level of sophistication.
By early establishment of these programs, a base is laid for 
expanding into other types of activities and broadening the scope 
of the overall assistance program.
Primary responsibility for initial response lies with the host 
government. In reality, however, few governments have sufficient 
capacity to deal with initial needs. Hence, NGOs, the UN and 
local Red Cross/Red Crescent societies are often encouraged to 
assist. The normal division of labor is as follows:
a) local government: coordination, protection, determining
refugee status, providing sites and providing water;
b) UNHCR: overall planning, monitoring, fund-raising and
general facilitation of the operation;
c) WFP: provision of food (basic rations and supplementary
foods);
d) NGOs: provision of specialized services (e.g., health,
supplementary feeding, preventative health services, 
immunizations, etc.).
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In an emergency response, key areas such as water and sanitation 
are often overlooked. In some large-scale situations, NGOs have 
been asked to take on responsibility for entire refugee camps.
It is in these situations where major problems often occur. NGOs 
consistently fail to recognize their limitations and the compre­
hensiveness of refugee needs. Sudan in 1985 provides an example 
of the problems this can create. Many NGOs demanded (and some 
were granted) permission to operate an entire refugee camp. Most 
of the agencies were medical agencies and were unprepared for 
anything beyond provision of medical assistance. The operation 
of a refugee camp is much like the management of a small city. 
People require not only food and medical attention but also 
water, sanitation, housing and shelter, garbage collection, and 
dozens of other services on a daily basis. Of the thirty relief 
organizations, only three had qualified engineers, only one had 
an architect, only three had environmental sanitation special­
ists, and only one had qualified water specialists. With this 
complement of technicians, the relief agencies proposed to meet 
the needs of a population the size of Geneva.
During the initial response, programs in the prime sectors of 
water, health, transport, shelter, and food and nutrition begin 
in earnest. Specific projects include:
a) distribution of the general ration;
b) supplementary feeding programs;
c) distribution of water;
d) sanitation programs;
e) immunization of vulnerable groups against communicable 
diseases;
f) oral rehydration therapy;
g) establishment of logistics systems;
h) overall camp planning and construction of shelters.
Until these programs are established and are running well, other 
activities should generally be postponed. Far too often, inex­
perienced relief agencies devote valuable time and resources, and 
tie up logistics systems, trying to respond with curative medical 
programs before other basic needs have been met. Diseases cannot 
be controlled unless there is an adequate supply of food. Food 
itself will have little bearing unless people are free from 
diarrhea. Diarrhea cannot be prevented unless there is an ade­
quate supply of clean water, and clean water depends on adequate 
sanitation and good hygiene practice.
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TRANSITION INTO BROADER, LONGER-TERM SUPPORT
Once the emergency response hds been firmly established and is 
operating smoothly, the scope of the assistance program can be broadened. 
During this period, health and nutrition programs are expanded, physical 
improvements to the camp and its environs are initiated, daily operating 
systems for the refugee camps are instituted, and social services programs 
such as family reunification, tracing, etc., may be initiated.
Activities carried out in the transition phase lay the groundwork for 
developing long-term maintenance and support activities that will provide 
assistance to the refugees until they can become partially self-sufficient 
and until a durable solution to their situation can be found.
In most cases the transition period marks the end of the emergency. 
However, if refugees continue to cross the border, and especially if they 
are in a poor nutritional or emotional state, certain emergency activities 
will need to be continued.
SECTORS IN EMERGENCY RELIEF
In relief efforts, program activities typically address a variety of 
needs. In emergency management, assistance activities are classified by 
sectors. The most important are health, water and sanitation, food, 
shelter and logistics. These are known as the prime sectors, because they 
are of primary concern during the initial stages of an emergency. A 
second group of sectors includes physical planning of settlements, social 
services, economic assistance, etc. These are known as secondary sectors 
(or support sectors) because they have indirect effects on the disaster 
victims.
Most emergency programs take a sectoral approach; that is, most pro­
grams focus on the problems unique to a particular sector and usually 
require technicians with skills that are specific to that particular 
field.
SUMMARY
Effective emergency management encompasses the complete realm of emer­
gency-related activities. Traditionally, people tend to view emergency 
management only in terms of emergency response and the immediate actions 
taken by relief officials. Yet emergency management covers a much broader 
scope, and many emergency managers find themselves far more involved in 
pre-emergency activities (such as preparedness) than in actual response. 
This trend can only be viewed as a positive development, for with greater 
attention to preparedness, early warning and forward planning, responses 
will be facilitated and greater effectiveness will be achieved.
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The purposes of this paper are:
1. to introduce the concept of emergency preparedness;
2. to define the scope of preparedness activities;
3. to define responsibilities for carrying out emergency prepared­
ness ; and
4. to provide examples of preparedness activities that can be under­
taken in the field and at headquarters.
INTRODUCTION
Emergency preparedness activities are extremely important for any 
organization working with refugees. An organization that is prepared for 
all contingencies is likely to respond well in the initial stages of an 
emergency a time when those that are unprepared generally make mistakes 
and ultimately lose many lives.
Emergency preparedness is based on the fundamental assumption that it 
is better to make decisions at a time when circumstances permit thorough 
and rational analysis rather than to react when information is minimal, 
incomplete and confusing. It is said that the objective of preparedness 
is to move decision-making forward out of the realm of the emergency and 
into the realm of studied, deliberate analysis.
The most important result of emergency preparedness is that it buys 
time for an organization to mobilize its resources. It allows an organi­
zation to respond quickly, yet with measured steps, escalating involvement 
and commitment of resources as the situation requires. An organization 
that is thoroughly prepared will neither under-react nor over-react to an 
emergency.
A. Def inition
Emergency preparedness may be defined as a set of actions taken by 
organizations and individuals to prepare for all emergencies. In this 
definition, note that both organizations and individuals are tasked with 
preparedness responsibility. This is an important point. Emergency 
preparedness is everyone's responsibility.
Note also that preparedness means preparing for all contingencies. 
Refugee emergencies can range from a major influx across a border to major 
human rights violations against refugees in the country of asylum; from 
refoulement to emergencies within an emergency, such as a bombing or
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shelling of a refugee camp, a fire within a camp, or an epidemic among the 
refugee population. It could also include natural disasters such as 
floods or administrative failures such as major food shortages. In one 
three-month period in eastern India in 1971, a refugee camp experienced an 
outbreak of cholera, an overnight tripling of the population, a fungus in 
food grains that caused massive diarrhoea, a fire that destroyed almost 
half the camp, and a flood that forced the entire camp to be evacuated. 
This camp had a population of over 100,000 people.
Again, preparedness is based on one simple premise: the heat of an 
emergency is no time to decide what to do. One of the principal charac­
teristics of an emergency is that information is scattered, conflicting, 
incomplete, and usually confusing; yet most emergencies follow distinctive 
patterns. The same problems tend to recur time and time again. Further­
more, experience has shown that certain approaches work well while others 
fail consistently. The process of analyzing past emergencies, determining 
what the options are, what works best and where an organization should 
concentrate its resources, is "emergency preparedness".
B. Scope
Emergency preparedness covers a wide range of activities. These 
include setting emergency policy; establishing emergency systems; assign­
ing emergency responsibilities; developing standard operating procedures; 
developing contingency plans; training key personnel (both organizational 
and counterpart staff); identifying sources of supplies; and, where 
necessary, stockpiling and pre-positioning supplies and equipment.
RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Field Responsibilities
Emergency preparedness begins in the field. In military organiza­
tions, while the military commander is responsible for ensuring that his 
unit is prepared, specific responsibility for preparedness and planning is 
usually assigned to a key subordinate within the organization. Taking a 
hint from this structure, it might be wise for organizations such as UNHCR 
to make emergency preparedness a part of the job description for a key 
subordinate in each of the Branch Offices. Because emergency preparedness 
is so important, a position as high as Deputy Representative could be 
assigned this task.
B. Headquarters Responsibilities
In most of the larger humanitarian organizations, some sort of emer­
gency office exists. The role of such an office or unit is usually seen 
as suppxxrt for field operations during a crisis. A far more important 
role is that of preparing the organization as a whole to meet any contin­
gency. For this reason, in recent years some organizations have changed 
the title of their units from "Emergency Unit" to "Emergency Preparedness 
Unit to reflect the changing role. Not only do preparedness units 
provide on-site technical support; more importantly, they provide training 
to key staff who are likely to be confronted with an emergency and to
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assist in developing systems, procedures and "tools" for the organiza­
tion. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the activities of the 
UNHCR Emergency Unit and the Training Section since 1985.
PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
A. Establishing an Emergency Doctrine
As mentioned earlier, emergencies tend to develop into set patterns 
and generally proceed along predictable lines. For example, an epidemic 
tends to follow a certain course and spread outward along certain 
epidemiologically-known paths. A massive influx of refugees likewise 
follows a general track. Clearly-discernible patterns evolve, and the 
situations and circumstances that lead to high mortality can easily be 
spotted and tracked by a trained observer.
Because the course of an emergency is predictable, it is possible to 
develop quick responses with predetermined activities and program strate­
gies. Developing a complete "package" for specific situations, and 
establishing policies to guide implementation, is known as establishing an 
emergency response doctrine. Of all preparedness activities, this is the 
most fundamental for it involves detailed discussion at both headquarters 
and field level and must be backed up by a thorough analysis of emergen­
cies in general, their impact, and the programs and approaches that can 
best be carried out in various environments and field conditions.
B. Preparedness Activities at Headquarters
The following are examples of preparedness activities that should be 
undertaken at headquarters.
1. Establishing a procedure for periodic updating of emergency
response policies: An extremely important role at headquarters
is deciding when an organization should become involved in an 
emergency, what actions it should take, and under what circum­
stances various types of resources should be committed. Much of 
the confusion in an emergency arises because field staff are 
unclear about the intentions of headquarters.
2. Establishing, and periodically reviewing, standard operating
procedures: SOPs (in UNHCR: letters of instruction, or LOIs) are
the means by which an organization sets limits on its initial 
intervention, i.e., they prevent an organization from over­
committing, yet at the same time permit, and structure, an 
immediate intervention. Thus, it is necessary to review the SOPs 
in terms of the organization’s overall policy and its emergency 
response doctrine. As much flexibility as possible must be given 
to the field and to the headquarters support staff.
3. Developing special procedures and systems to reduce bureaucratic
delays: In every organization there are standard rules that must
be followed in the normal course of work. They control the flow 
of paperwork, decision-making and planning. In an emergency,
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shortcuts simply must be found. Such things as bidding proce­
dures , contract negotiations and even certain types of receipts, 
must often be waived in order to move quickly. The purpose of 
intervention is to save lives. Any bureaucratic procedures that 
delay this function must be either streamlined or temporarily 
suspended, but the conditions under which these extraordinary 
procedures go into effect must be clearly defined before an 
emergency begins.
Preparing emergency guidelines and manuals: Once an organization
has decided how it wants to respond, its staff must have the 
information they need to carry out that response. Emergency 
manuals should be short and consise. The OXFAM Guide to Selec­
tive Feeding Procedures is a prime example. Generally, compre­
hensive manuals should be avoided; short, sturdy, easily-carried 
guides and pamphlets that can be quickly translated into local 
languages should be developed.
Establishing skeleton task forces to respond to different types 
of emergencies: Some types of emergencies require additional
technical and administrative skills beyond the usual professional 
input from desk officers and administrative staff. Therefore, a 
key preparedness activity at headquarters is establishing 
organigrams of task forces with the required mix of expertise to 
support the field staff during various types of emergencies.
Developing emergency budgetary and finance procedures: Few
organizations have realistic policies regarding financial proce­
dures during emergencies. A key headquarters preparedness acti­
vity is to review these procedures and establish the necessary 
shortcuts to speed budgeting and movement of funds while 
retaining the necessary accountability.
Developing emergency systems, and training staff in how to use 
them: This is a very important headquarters function. Based on
research and evaluation of past performance, systems and "tools" 
should be developed to facilitate emergency response. Once these 
systems have been developed, they are essentially useless until 
the people that will use them are given the appropriate training.
Developing and improving early warning capabilities: Few emer­
gencies occur without adequate warning. Relief and humanitarian 
organizations should develop the capability to collect and 
analyze data that can give early warning of a developing emer­
gency. Define the types of data needed and institute an 
organization-wide effort to routinely collect and report on 
developments that might indicate when an emergency is about to 
occur.
Evaluating past operations to establish the lessons: Evaluation
and analysis of past operations are key components of emergency 
preparedness. Only by understanding the successes and failures 
of previous experience can response doctrine be developed and 
improved.
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10. Establishing procurement arrangements and developing stockpiles
of key materials: In almost every operation it is necessary to
send certain key relief items from one country to another. Items 
crucial to implementation of an agency's response doctrine should 
be identified, procurement arrangements established and plans 
developed to quickly acquire, transport and deliver these 
priority items.
11. Recruiting and training emergency response teams: In large-scale
emergencies, field personnel are likely to require assistance 
from experts and technicians experienced in certain responses or 
emergency programs. Whenever possible, response teams should be 
formed and trained as a unit before being placed on standby.
12. Establishing standing arrangements with volags/consultants for
technical services: Since few organizations can afford to keep
large numbers of highly-trained technicians on their staff 
between emergencies, it is usually necessary to contract for 
specialized services. A key preparedness activity is to identify 
organizations and individuals whose services might be needed to 
complement or extend staff capabilities and to arrange standby 
agreements in advance so that their services can be obtained 
quickly. Short-lists of pre-qualified contractors, indefinite 
quantity contracts, etc., can speed the negotiation process and 
shorten response time.
c * Preparedness Activities in the Field
The following are examples of field preparedness activities.
Developing contingency plans for the most likely emergencies.
This is the most important activity that can be carried out at 
the field level. Contingency planning should be a group exercise 
of key line and technical staff; plans should be reviewed at 
least annually in normal times and more frequently when it 
appears that an emergency is developing.
Identifying in-country sources of supplies and equipment: Each
field office should develop, and periodically update, lists of 
local suppliers of food, medicines and other relief items. Where 
possible, contingency procurement agreements should be arranged. 
It is often possible to have local suppliers establish and main­
tain buffer stocks of certain items, especially in countries with 
a history of emergency needs.
Developing general working arrangements with the government and 
implementing partners. Since emergency response is likely to be 
an inter-agency effort, one important preparedness activity is to 
meet with implementing partners, dividing roles and responsibili­
ties and pre-assigning tasks, so that clear lines of authority, 
responsibility and coordination are established and competition 





Conducting policy reviews of the local government’s likely 
responses to various emergencies: The extent and type of 
response by a host government to a refugee emergency varies 
according to political constraints. For example, some refugees 
may be more welcome than others, and the willingness to accept 
refugees at all may be shaped by internal considerations such as 
in-country food shortages, domestic political crises or social 
and ethnic considerations. Preparedness planners should try to 
ascertain the likely responses of a government to various 
emergencies and to design and modify their contingency plans 
accordingly.
5. Identifying potential geographic operating areas: In most cases, 
the places where refugees are likely to enter a country can be 
pre-identified from topographical features, transportation routes 
and natural barriers such as rivers, mountainous terrain, etc. 
Based on the development of scenarios that indicate possible 
border crossing points, potential operational theaters can be 
defined. Within those theaters, sites for refugee camps, 
logistics bases, etc., can be identified and, in some cases, 
surveyed to verify their suitability. It is also important to 
collect data on roads, railways, airports and possible river 
transport facilities. (Some organizations prepare profiles that 
list key operational information for each country. Someone from 
the field staff should personally inspect the roads, airports and 
the transportation network periodically and report any signifi­
cant changes.)
0 Establishing early warning procedures. All field staff, and 
especially those who work near a border, should be thoroughly 
briefed on how to recognize early warning indicators. Routine 
information-gathering activities and reporting procedures should 
be clearly established and carried out on a routine basis.
7. Determining protection options/requirements. In any emergency, 
protection of refugees is likely to be a key consideration. It 
is important that the organization determine the approaches it 
will use to provide protection and how many personnel will be 
required.
For preparedness planning to be effective, the activities must be 
carried out both at the field level and in an organization’s headquar­




1. Make a list of additional preparedness activities that should be 
undertaken at the headquarter level.
2. Make a list of actions that should be carried out by branch or field 
of f ices.
3. Make a list of systems, materials and tools that headquarters should 
have on hand in order to provide better coordination for emergencies. 
List these according to the principal sections and divisions of the 
organization.
4. Make a list of the systems, materials and tools that the field staff 
should have on hand in order to respond to any emergency. Be as 
specific as possible and group your suggestions according to the types 






The purposes of this paper are:
1. to acquaint the student with the concept of forward planning;
2. to identify the key elements of the forward planning process;
3. to review the scope of activities usually carried out;
4. to identify the information needed; and
5. to explore some techniques used to improve forward planning.
INTRODUCTION
A. Definition
Forward planning is comprised of a series of actions taken to prepare 
for an impending emergency (especially a mass influx). Forward planning 
begins when an organization recognizes that all the signs clearly indicate 
an emergency is about to occur. In other words, forward planning is an 
organization’s first level of response to early warning.
B. Key Concepts
Forward planning is the implementation side of early warning. In 
effect, it answers the question, "what do you do in response to early 
warning?” It is the first escalation of intensity and sets the stage for 
all subsequent emergency response activities.
Forward planning is also an extension of emergency preparedness. Any 
activities that were not carried out beforehand need to be implemented on 
a crash" basis. Like preparedness, forward planning is based on certain 
key concepts. The most important of these are that early decision-making 
is both cost-effective and desirable in laying the foundation for 
emergency response, and that there are patterns, indicators and triggers 
that can be discerned and analyzed to provide the data needed to initiate 
forward planning.
Forward planning is another example of moving the decision-making 
process forward into the pre-emergency period when decisions can be taken 
rationally and on the basis of more thorough analysis. However, decision­
making at this point becomes far more crucial and, in many cases, a factor 
of risk needs to be incorporated into the decision-making process.
Nowhere is this more important than in decisions to order, stockpile and 
pre-position food and medical supplies.
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Decision-making in emergencies should be based on an understanding of 
the decision chain. In recent years, a new branch of emergency operations 
theory has evolved: emergency decision-making, or EDM. Scientists have 
begun to study the cause-and-effect relationships of decisions with regard 
to certain activities carried out in emergencies and how the decision­
making process can be improved. The goal is to identify recognized 
scenarios that repeat themselves in the various types of emergencies, 
then to help decision-makers recognize an unfolding scenario in order to 
make decisions at the appropriate point and at a time when the decision 
can still have an impact on developing events.
Take, for example, decisions regarding food supply. In many develop­
ing countries, adequate supplies of food may not be available and food may 
have to be imported from other countries. In some parts of the world, it 
may take several months from the time food is ordered until it arrives. 
Assuming that the lead time could be as long as ninety days, the "window" 
for decision-making is fairly limited. Food supplies must be ordered as 
soon as it appears evident that large numbers of people will cross the 
border. Failure to make an early decision means that one of two things
happen: either the relief agency takes extraordinary measures to get
food to the area, or large numbers of people may not receive adequate 
rations. If the people are malnourished when they enter the country, a 
high mortality rate can be expected. Failure to make an early decision 
means that the range of choices is limited. Instead of being able to ship 
food at a relatively cheap cost by sea or land, the agency will be forced 
to transport it by air. While the deadline for getting food to the site 
can still be met, the cost will increase tenfold. In other words, the 
longer a decision is delayed, the more likely it will become a choice of 
taking the least worst option. In our example, flying food at tremendous 
expense is a costly option versus experiencing a high death rate in the 
camps --  an unacceptable option.
With a little forethought, EDM scenarios can be developed for every 
country and unfolding emergency. By constructing these scenarios, plan­
ners can easily see when it is important to make decisions and they can 
react accordingly.
In developing scenarios for the most likely emergencies, it is 
important to establish what constitutes an emergency for each particular 
country. In a region where agencies are well prepared, where stockpiles 
of food are available, and where operating agencies are stationed along 
the border, an influx of several hundred people would hardly be notice­
able. In a country with no existing program, even as few as several 
thousand new arrivals could represent a major crisis.
RESPONSE TO TRIGGERS
Forward planning begins when recognized "triggers" occur. The res­
ponse should be automatic and should proceed with little debate. Simply 
because a trigger has occurred does not necessarily mean that an influx 
follow; but once the trigger has been recognized, the organization 
must be prepared to take chances. It is far better to end up with un­
needed food supplies (which can later be sold) than to have none on hand 
when they are needed.
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EFFECTIVE RESPONSE CORNERSTONES
Forward planning is based on a clear recognition of the major problem 
areas in most emergencies and the program approaches that work best to 
keep people alive. Major threats to refugees' lives are diarrhea and 
dehydration, malnutrition and communicable diseases, especially measles. 
All of these are interrelated. A person who is malnourished or dehydrated 
stands less chance of resisting disease. Food can often not be taken 
unless there is an adequate supply of clean water, and water alone cannot 
provide the nutrients needed for survival.
Recognition of these threats as the major killers indicates the 
responses that should be given priority and the specific areas to which 
authorities carrying out forward planning should devote the majority of 
their attention. The top priorities requiring early decisions are: 
ordering and pre-positioning food, identifying potential disease threats, 
ordering vaccines for immunization campaigns, establishing a cold chain to 
ensure the medicines are delivered with full efficacy, and identifying 
means of supplying clean drinking water and protecting it from contami­
nation by providing decent sanitation.
In order to ensure that all supplies are on site, the other major 
consideration is logistics. Without adequate transport, warehousing and 
logistics management, food, medicines, shelter and even water may not be 
able to reach the refugees at the crucial time.
Another priority during forward planning is protection. For UNHCR, 
protection activities must include a predetermination of the status of 
asylum-seekers, establishing a presence at the border or in the settle­
ments, and establishing a monitoring system to report on any human rights 
violations. For non-governmental relief organizations, protection 
activities may include establishing a large presence in the area in order 
to rescue or escort border-crossers to points of safety, and becoming 
familiar with international rules and procedures for assisting asylum- 
seekers .
Other important actions which should be taken include:
1. making preparations for receiving and registering incoming 
refugees.
2. identification of sites for new refugee camps, or determining 
which existing settlements can be expanded for new settlers.
3. determining shelter options and material needs.
4. making arrangements for supplementary feeding and, if necessary, 
ordering food.
5. determining fuel requirements.
6. preparing staffing plans and designating field leaders.
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defining the operating areas and the responsibilities for 
organizations within those areas.
determining storage requirements at key points in the logistics 
chain.
INFORMATION NEEDS
A major preoccupation during forward planning is information gather- 
ing. There is one simple axiom which governs the effectiveness of forward 
planning: the better the information, the better the plans. It is vital
that the following questions be answered or predicted as closely as 
possible:
1. How many people are likely to seek asylum?
It is important to know how many people are likely to cross a 
border, how many displaced persons are likely to stop just short 
of the border, and how many are likely to enter the country 
temporarily before returning to their country of origin. This 
information can be developed or estimated on the basis of:
a. reports from reliable sources on movements of displaced 
persons;
b. projections of demographic information;
c. review of past experience in the same area.
2. At what rate are asylum-seekers likely to cross the border?
The rate of influx is almost as important as estimating how many 
people are likely to come. If the people come across in manage­
able numbers, a major emergency might not develop. But if all 
the people come within a short period, the situation will be more 
confusing and response will be more difficult.
3. Who is coming?
It is important to know who the asylum-seekers might be. Infor­
mation can usually be gathered quickly as to ethnic origin, 
tribal or cultural groups, and religious beliefs. It is also 
important to know whether the people are from urban or rural 
areas and what their principal occupations are.
4. In what shape are asylum-seekers likely to be?
Certain precautions will need to be taken if people have been 
fleeing over long distances; if they are coming from an area of 
acute food shortage, drought or famine; or if they are fleeing 
through areas of known disease threats (cholera, malaria, etc.). 
It is usually possible to gain a fairly clear picture of their 
status simply by identifying the areas of origin and the distance
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that people have to travel. The mode of transport is also a key 
factor; if people are walking, they will be in worse shape than 
if they are coming in trucks or boats.
5. Family composition?
It is important to estimate whether families will be arriving 
intact or certain members are likely to be missing. In many 
refugee situations, adult males are missing from the initial 
ranks of asylum-seekers. This may be due to a number of fac­
tors. First, they may have decided to remain at home to try to 
protect their property and belongings as long as possible, 
sending the family to safety outside the zone of conflict. In 
other cases, the men may have joined one side or the other of a 
conflict. And in the worst case, men may have been killed in the 
fighting. In famine situations, it is not uncommon to find few 
children under the age of two and a disproportionately low 
percentage of children under the age of five. These are the 
children most vulnerable to famine and, if the percentages are 
askew, it will be important to establish supplementary feeding 
programs to drastically reduce mortality among the survivors.
6. When can the majority of asylum-seekers be expected to arrive?
Forecasting the time when most people will arrive is an important 
task, for it establishes points at which decisions about certain 
things have to be made. The ETA may be available from press 
reports, reports of military action, and from refugee or insur­
gent groups. In other cases, it may be necessary to estimate the 
time it takes for people to walk from a point of conflict to the 
border.
7. At what points are the refugees likely to cross the border?
By examining topographic maps of the border areas, it is usually 
possible to determine where refugees are most likely to cross.
The most salient features include roads in rebel-held areas, 
rivers and streams that people can easily follow, established 
migratory routes of nomadic peoples, and other routes that people 
could easily follow that offer some protection or concealment 
from attacks by hostile forces, especially air attacks.
TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE FORWARD PLANNING
Much of forward planning involves making educated guesses as to what 
scenarios may develop. There are, however, a number of ways to improve 
forecasting:
A. Remote detection
It is often possible to determine the health and nutritional status of 
persons who may seek assistance but are currently outside the reach of
5
organized or extensive relief programs. These could include refugees 
living in an area of conflict, people known to be in transit to reception 
centers, persons trapped by fighting and unable to flee, and small groups 
of people from remote famine areas. In most cases, only limited informa­
tion about these groups is available; yet conclusions must be drawn about 
their health and nutritional status in order to determine whether direct 
emergency assistance should be provided before they arrive (such as cross- 
border relief) and what assistance should be ready if and when they 
arrive. The process of determining health status and people’s needs is 
called "remote detection". It relies on:
1. interviews with recently-arrived refugees;
2. interviews with relief or other personnel operating in or near 
the population of concern;
3. assessment of the health and nutritional status of the first 
arrivals. The procedure is to interview a sample of the families 
among the new arrivals. The arm circumference or weight-for- 
height ratios of all children under 5 is measured and each family 
is asked about:
--  age of each person in family,
--  area of the country they are from,
--- length of time in transit and distance traveled,
--- occupation of the head of the household,
--  number of live births in last five years,
--- number of children still living,
--- number who died in last two months (since travel began) and
causes,
--- reason for departure.
From the previous information, develop the following data:
1 • Age Pyramid. Compare with usual age pyramid of the country of 
origin. Differences can be noted and reasons can usually be 
predicted.
2. Place of Origin. If the refugees are from several regions in 
their homeland, the data on childhood mortality, nutrition, etc., 
can be broken down by region to give an assessment of conditions 
each area of the homeland.
3. Reasons for Fleeing. Was this an anticipatory or acute refugee 
movement? If anticipatory, the next wave of refugees is likely 
to be in far worse condition.
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4. Nutrition Data. Present data about the nutrition level of the 
refugees can be developed to give a picture of people still 
inside the country of origin. From this, it should be possible 
to determine whether a nutritional rehabilitation program will be 
necessary for refugees yet to arrive.
5» Mortality Data. The procedure can give a picture of recent 
deaths of children less than five years old.
6* Health Problems. The best example of this is malaria. In many 
developing countries, malaria is only present in rural areas or 
below a certain altitude. In assessing the risk for a major 
malaria problem, it is important to know the origin of the 
refugees and whether they emigrated through a malaria-endemic 
area. If they were at least partially immune to malaria because 
of prior exposure in their homeland, malaria might not be a major 
problem, even if they are housed in refugee camps in a malaria- 
endemic area.
7* Length of Time in Transit. The longer the transit time, the more 
likely the refugees are to be debilitated. If they have been in 
transit for a very long time, they may be in poor health even 
though the population left behind in their area may be healthy.
While not completely accurate, remote detection provides very valuable 
information for forward planning.
B. Standardized. Packages of Assistance
Most emergency managers develop assistance packages around units of 
5,000 people. 5,000 people require 52.5 tons of food per month, one-half 
kilometer square of land area for a refugee camp, one supplementary 
feeding center, 225 latrines, and a water supply of 50,000 liters of 
water per day. By using this basic planning unit as the building block 
for the response, planners can easily estimate the amount of supplies, 
land, etc., that will be required. Any over-supply will be minimal and 
under-supply can be virtually eliminated.
C. Modeling Aid Needs
As soon as a reliable estimate of the number of refugees is esta­
blished and the crossing rate is estimated, it is possible to develop a 
general model of the rate of influx and the amount of supplies that need 
to be purchased. A number of planning models can be used. The most 
common is a linear projection. The problem with linear projection is that 
it does not allow for periodic increases or decreases in the rate of 
influx. With this model, planners are likely to find shortages in the 
initial stages and an over-supply in the later stages.
Another model, depicted below, was proposed by the author in 1984.
This model, which should be updated on a weekly basis, provides some
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flexibility and stimulates larger procurement at the outset of an opera­
tion while providing enough time for adjustments at later stages.
Procedure:
To determine the number of refugees for contingency planning, use the 









The number of refugees now receiving assistance 
The number of new arrivals in last week 
Percentage of the total that new arrivals (last week) 
represent
The time in weeks needed to deliver supplies (e.g., if a 
two-month lead time, use 8)
Always round contingency planning number to next 5,000 
increment.
Example: Assume there are 10,000 refugees now, and last week 1,000
more arrived. Also assume an 8-week lead time for shipping 
supplies.
CN = 10,000 + (1,000 x 8) + .10 (8,000)
CN = 10,000 + 8,000 + 800 
CN = 18,800
CN = 20,000 (rounded to next 5,000 increment)
With the advent of portable micro-computers and more sophisticated 
modeling programs, models can be developed which will greatly enhance 
planners’ abilities to forecast refugee requirements as they unfold.
D. Building Redundancy and Margins of Safety
As planners design the emergency response, it is important that 
redundancy be built into each delivery system. At the outset of an 
emergency, when things are confusing and systems are not well-established, 
many breakdowns and delays can be expected. It is vital, therefore, to 
build into the system large margins of safety and multiple delivery 
systems. When procuring supplies, dual and even triple sources should be 
tapped. Transport by a variety of means and contractors should be 
established. And most important, sufficient reserves and buffer stocks 
should be stockpiled to meet all contingencies.
SETTING THRESHOLDS
Thresholds are reference points that an organization establishes to 
determine when it is necessary to take further action or the point at 
which a decision must be made to escalate the level of activity.
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In terras of early warning, a threshold could be the removal of an 
intervening factor. It could also be a recognition of an event at the end 
of an early warning "chain", such as the selling of animals during a 
drought or forced migration. Operationally, the threshold might be an 
event such as a substantial increase in the refugee population within a 
short period of time, an indication that a population on the move in a 
neighboring country has reached a certain geographical point on their way 
to the border, or any number of other clear signs that refugees are about 
to leave their country. It is important that thresholds be clearly 
established as an emergency develops and that everyone in the organization 
be thoroughly briefed on what to do when a threshold is crossed.
EXERCISES
1. List the specific actions that need to be taken to determine refugee 
status and to assure protection for incoming asylum-seekers. Identify 
the constraints that might prevent or hamper protection activities.
2. List and describe specific actions to prepare for receiving and 
assisting incoming refugees. Identify the constraints to each action 
and alternate approaches for overcoming these restraints.
3. List and describe specific activities which can be carried out at the 
headquarters level to support the field in the forward planning 
process. Describe the constraints within the organization that might 
inhibit forward planning at the headquarters level.
4. List the main systems, programs or activities that require redundancy 
and/or built-in safety margins.
5. Develop a contingency planning model that will help you plan and 
control food requirements for an incoming refugee population. (Remem­
ber the long lead times required for international shipment of foods.)
6. Develop a planning model that will enable you to procure and deliver 
vaccines on a timely basis. (Remember that the shelf life of certain 
vaccines may be time-limited.)
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THE RELIEF SYSTEM
Frederick C . Cuny 
INTERTECT
1988
The purposes of this paper are:
1. to define the refugee relief system;
to explain the relationships among the various organizations 
within the system; and
to identify the primary reasons why problems of inter-organiza­
tional coordination develop and how they might be overcome.
INTRODUCTION
What is generally referred to as the refugee "relief system" is not a 
system at all; it is an ad hoc group of agencies that collectively provide 
funds or services to assist refugees.
Each of these organizations has competing agendas, different levels of 
expertise, and different interests with regard to the refugees. As we 
shall see, amid this confusing array of organizations and interests, it is 
important that one single entity serve as an anchor for the provision of 
assistance and as a guarantor of international protection for refugees.
For the most part, this responsibility falls on the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.*
Within the international system, there are many misconceptions about 
the roles of different organizations, especially that of the UNHCR and the 
various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These misunderstandings 
lead to major shortcomings and gaps in the provision of assistance. Often 
donors fail to understand the limitations of the various organizations, 
and those within the system fail to foresee gaps in the services they 
provide until they are well into a relief operation.
#It should also be recognized that many of the shortcomings are sys­
temic; in other words, they are shortcomings of the international system 
itself rather than of specific organizations.
* For Palestinian refugees, the primary agency is the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).
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DEFINING THE SYSTEM
Under international law, the entity responsible for refugees is the 
government of the country of asylum, or "host" country. In most coun­
tries, the government will assign operational responsibility to a parti­
cular governmental ministry or department. This may be a specialized 
agency or a branch of an existing ministry.
Typicallyt a government will structure its refugee agency with the 
headquarters in the capital, will place a senior official as coordinator 
close to the area where refugees are entering the country, and will 
appoint a number of camp or settlement administrators at the locations 
where refugees are being placed as soon as they arrive. This hierarchical 
system is depicted below.
Figure 1
When an emergency occurs, UNHCR will normally develop a "mirror image" 
of the government’s administrative hierarchy. In the capital, there is 
the Branch Office; in the forward or regional area, a Sub-Office; and at 
the camp level, Field Officers who are attached to each of the major 
settlements.
The head of the Branch Office is the UNHCR Representative whose main 
unction is to act as liaison directly with the head of the government’s 
refugee agency. At the Sub-Office level, the Head of the Sub-Office is 
the liaison with the Regional Coordinator. At the camp level, the Field 
Officer is the liaison with the Camp Administrator.
Non-governmental organizations will also generally adopt a similar 
structure (although, depending on the size of the agency, the post of 
regional coordinator may be omitted). The title of the head of the 
country office is usually "field director"; the teams in the camps are 
headed by a "team leader" or a "project director".
2
The in-country structure of the various organizations is depicted in 
the following figure.
Figure 2
Support for operations is provided by international donors. The main 
donors are individual countries who may contribute through UNHCR (multi- 
laterally), may provide assistance directly to the host government (bi­
laterally) or provide support through NGOs. Donations from individuals, 
corporations or charities are smaller but still can play a significant 
role.
The UNHCR serves as the primary conduit for international funding, 
passing the monies on to the host government and serving as the guarantor 
of accountability on behalf of the international community. NGOs normally 
finance their own programs in the field, either with their own funds or 
with assistance from their government. In some cases, NGOs will also fund 
UNHCR programs, and they often provide funds or services directly to the 
host government’s refugee agency. Assistance can be in the form of cash, 
in-kind materials, technical assistance or training. Thus, the UNHCR and 
some international NGOs play a dual role; they are both donors and imple­
menting agencies.











A. The Host Government
Under international refugee accords, the host government bears ulti­
mate responsibility for protection and care of refugees. When the 
accords were drawn up in the 1950s, and most refugees were Europeans 
fleeing to other European countries, the system worked well enough. But 
since the 1960s, with the vast majority of refugees generated and hosted 
in the Third World, the system has begun to break down. In impoverished 
countries, refugees are not only a major economic burden, they can also 
bring political trouble for the host country. Most governments have a 
difficult enough time meeting the needs of their own population without 
having to feed and care for thousands more. Furthermore, few countries 
can afford to fund and staff large refugee assistance organizations and 
support them in remote rural areas. Thus, an ever-increasing portion of 
the burden is being assumed by non-governmental organizations on behalf of 
the government.
B. NGOs
Non-governmental organizations are essentially service agencies, i.e., 
they provide distinctive sets of services to specific segments of the 
society, usually the very poor. The vast majority of these organizations 
are either general development agencies or medical organizations. Many of 
the larger international organizations are multi-purpose; in other words, 
they can provide services for several different sectors. For example, an 
organization such as Save the Children may support health programs, feed­
ing programs, selective feeding programs (supplementary, therapeutic, 
etc.), as well as sanitation and water programs.
In a few cases, major international NGOs may serve as foundations, 
providing funds to local organizations and sometimes to the host govern­
ment's refugee relief agency. The primary example is OXFAM/UK.
Because NGOs are service agencies, the scope of their activities is 
fairly limited; they can do a few tasks very well on a large scale but 
cannot undertake a wide range of activities on a large scale. This is one 
of the fundamental causes of problems in the relief system, for major 
donors tend to regard the NGOs as all-encompassing —  capable of providing 
services in any sector —  when in fact most of the agencies have limited 
capabilities. When a NGO is given major responsibility for providing 
assistance to an entire settlement, it is usually able to focus only on 
the sectors in which it specializes; often, important elements of an 
assistance package are overlooked and critical needs go unmet.
C. UNHCR
The primary assistance role of UNHCR in an emergency operation is to 
facilitate the work of the host government by providing funding, technical 
assistance and, where requested, coordination. Until recently, UNHCR 
insisted on maintaining that limited focus, arguing that it was the role 
of the host country and NGOs to provide direct assistance. UNHCR, it was 
argued, was not an operational agency. But too many gaps existed. Many
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host governments simply did not have the capability of providing compre­
hensive assistance, and NGOs were not effective in filling in these gaps. 
It could be argued that it was the role of the international community to 
support the governments and help them expand their capabilities. But in 
an emergency, when highly-trained and experienced personnel are needed 
on-site, training programs that take several months to realize are not 
really feasible.
An example of the gaps that occur can be seen in an examination of the 
emergency situation in Sudan in 1985. Many NGOs demanded (and some were 
granted) permission to "operate” a refugee camp entirely by themselves. 
Most of these agencies were totally unprepared to undertake such a mis­
sion. Many were primarily medical agencies, unprepared for anything 
beyond provision of medical assistance. The operation of a refugee camp 
is much like the management of a small city: people require not only food
and medical attention, but also water, sanitation, housing and shelter, 
garbage collection and dozens of other services on a daily basis. Of the 
thirty-plus relief organizations, only three included qualified engineers, 
only one had an architect, only three had environmental sanitation 
specialists, and only one had qualified water specialists. With this 
complement of technicians, the relief agencies proposed to meet the needs 
of a population the size of Geneva.
Since 1986, UNHCR has begun to undertake a more active role in emer­
gency operations. In particular, the Technical Support unit has been 
expanded and the number of technicians, as well as technical specialities, 
has been increased. Nonetheless, it is impossible for any one organiza­
tion to meet all the needs of various emergencies simultaneously. For 
this reason, UNHCR must often turn to private consultants or specialist 
consulting firms who provide technicians to manage key parts of relief 
operations. The most common areas that are contracted are logistics and 
operations management.
D. Other UN Agencies
Three other UN agencies have major roles to play in refugee relief 
operations: WFP, UNICEF and WHO.
The World Food Program is often the major source of basic food sup­
plies for refugee emergencies. In many countries, WFP provides food aid 
in normal times; when an emergency arises, priority is shifted to meeting 
emergency needs.
WFP maintains a special emergency office at its headquarters in Rome. 
These specialists work to procure and ship large quantities of food for 
emergencies and can provide on-site technical assistance. (In 1986 a 
Memorandum of Understanding clarifying the roles of WFP and UNHCR in 
emergency food operations was worked out between the two organizations. )
UNICEF may be involved in any number of ways. At the outset, UNICEF 
usually assists local health ministries with immunization programs. Other 
interventions have included family reunification programs, assistance to 
unaccompanied minors, supplementary feeding programs, special health care 
programs for women and children, children’s educational services, psycho­
logical counseling for children and mothers, and special programs for
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"children in especially difficult circumstances" (a new UNICEF initia­
tive) .
UNICEF has an Emergency Unit located at its headquarters in New York. 
The unit provides technical assistance and can arrange for teams of UNICEF 
specialists or consultants to support specific operations.
UNICEF has one advantage over its sister UN organizations! it is 
mandated to go anywhere necessary to help children. In some cases, this 
means that it is possible to work in areas where host governments are not 
represented (i.e., rebel-held territories). In 1979-80 UNICEF was active 
in cross-border operations into rebel—held areas of Kampuchea and was able 
to provide much-needed assistance to displaced persons who later became 
refugees.
The World Health Organization can support refugee emergency operations 
directly by providing technical assistance through UNHCR or by assisting 
the health ministry in the host country. The Pan American Health Organi­
zation (PAHO), the Latin American regional arm of WHO, has been especially 
active in training and supporting emergency preparedness activities in the 
member countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
E - The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
The ICRC is a major player in most conflicts that generate refugees. 
Under the Geneva accords, the ICRC is responsible for assisting civilians 
in areas of conflict where they are not protected by their own country.
In practice, this means that ICRC often deals with people who are dis­
placed and may later become refugees. In most cases, ICRC assistance will 
end at the border; once they cross into the country of asylum, they become 
the responsibility of UNHCR. If resources permit, however, ICRC may also 
lend assistance in refugee settlements during the emergency period. In 
Thailand in 1979, many ICRC delegates worked in the Kampuchean refugee 
camps. In such cases, the ICRC teams function much like those of NGOs; 
they provide specific services under the direction of the host government.
Ideally ICRC could provide much-needed information about developing 
emergencies and possible refugee flows, the routes people might choose to 
flee the country, and advance information about the status of potential 
asylum-seekers. In practice, ICRC delegates tend to be reticent about 
discussing such matters, fearing that it could compromise their work. 
Nonetheless, informal coordination can often be very useful.
In terms of services, ICRC tends to concentrate heavily on medical and 
general health care and food logistics.
F • Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM)
ICM is a Geneva-based organization originally established to assist in 
resettling refugees to third countries. In recent years it has changed 
its constitution to enable it to take a much broader role in refugee 
affairs. As an organization in transition, its new role has not yet been 
fully defined, but during the next few years it obviously will be taking a 
broader look at emergency assistance, especially by those that meet wider 
definitions such as the OAU. It is also likely to look into the problems
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of internally-displaced persons and persons fleeing for economic reasons. 
At the same time, the organization is likely to continue to concentrate on 
finding permanent solutions to refugee situations and moving to apply 
these solutions early in an emergency.
THE DONORS
At the international level, donors are: 1) the individual countries;
2) the multilateral organizations, such as the European community, OAU, 
ASEAN, and the OAS; 3) specialized intergovernmental donor agencies; and, 
to a much lesser extent, 4) private foundations such as the Ford Founda­
tion and specialized fund-raising groups such as BANDAID, USA for Africa, 
etc. Finally, there are the private individuals that give money directly 
to the UNHCR or to various NGOs.
By far the largest amount of funding comes from interested govern­
ments. With only a few exceptions, most of the money is channeled through 
the UNHCR. The permanent donors that support the UNHCR are represented on 
its governing committee, the Executive Committee or ExCom. In some cases, 
the larger donors may choose to provide bilateral assistance to the host 
country or to support NGOs. For example, Britain, often a major 
contributor to UNHCR, provides additional funding to British NGOs such as 
OXFAM, War on Want, Christian Aid and Save the Children. Many governments 
prefer to provide funding through the NGOs, especially if the host govern­
ment does not have a strong record of supporting refugees or if the 
government's ability to handle the funds properly and effectively is in 
question.
THE MAJOR PLAYERS
Within the international system, there are several entities that must 
be considered the major players. While the entire relief system is 
composed of hundreds of different organizations, only a relative handful 
can be considered key. What makes these organizations "key" is a combina­
tion of the resources they command; the contributions of money, goods or 
technology they can provide; and the influence they wield as "pace­
setters" relative to the state of the art.
A . US Government
No country responds more fully to refugee emergencies than the United 
States. It responds with cash, in-kind materials, technical assistance, 
transport and especially food aid. The US is usually one of the largest 
annual donors to UNHCR and also provides substantial funding to NGOs and 
bilateral assistance to host governments.
US assistance is coordinated by the Bureau for Refugee Programs in the 
US Department of State. In some countries the Bureau (known as "RP") may 
have a resident Refugee Reporting Officer to coordinate American assis­
tance.
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There are* of course, many political ramifications to American aid.
The response of the US to any refugee emergency will depend upon its 
relationship with the country of origin as well as the country of asylum. 
Not only are strategic interests involved, but also the question of 
whether the refugees may seek to resettle in the US. The United States is 
a key actor not only because of the resources it can provide, but also 
because it has been a major advocate for improving the overall delivery of 
services to refugees and has supported major training efforts by UNHCR and 
implementing organizations.
The US PL480 program, also known as Food for Peace, is a major source 
of food for refugees. The program is administered by the US Agency for 
International Development (AID) which has Missions in most developing 
countries. At the request of RP, USAID may also provide technical assis­
tance and, in some cases, funds or other resources to assist in the relief 
effort.
B. Other Major Donors
Other major donor governments include the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France, Norway, The Netherlands, Australia, Japan and Saudi Arabia. All 
have large aid programs and a long history of providing assistance to 
refugees. Britain and France are often tied to their former colonial 
territories by a combination of sentiment and economic interests and thus 
can be counted on to respond in these areas quickly and on a large scale.
In an emergency, all of these countries respond in much the same way 
as the US, offering a combination of direct and indirect assistance, cash 
and material aid, and technicians and equipment. Most of these countries 
also support private development or relief organizations that can be 
brought into the emergency operation.
There are, of course, many other governments that regularly provide 
assistance; indeed, virtually every government close to the affected 
country or with religious or economic ties may make some form of contribu­
tion.
C. Multilaterals
Among the multilateral organizations, the European community is the 
largest donor. In many ways, the organization complements the assistance 
of its member countries. In recent years, the EEC has also been a major 
contributor of specialized food aid, such as high protein biscuits, dry 
skim milk, etc.
D. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
The Red Cross movement is represented internationally by the League of 
Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies headquartered in Geneva. The role of 
the League is to support the national societies that make up its member­
ship. When a national society commits to an emergency, it normally turns 
to the League for support. With over 100 member societies, the League can 
move quickly to mobilize large amounts of cash and materials, and can 
often field technical teams from member societies.
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E. Non-Governmental Organizations
There are several NGOs that stand out as key organizations, including:
--  OXFAM, which has made major contributions in developing program
approaches, guides and procedural manuals for such programs as 
supplemental feeding, and has developed highly-specialized water 
and sanitation systems for refugee emergencies.
Save the Children (UK), which has pioneered many of the health 
approaches used in refugee and famine emergencies.
--  CARE, which has developed a strong specialization in refugee food
logistics.
CONCERN, which has developed integrated health and feeding 
programs for refugees, especially supplementary feeding and 
public health and sanitation.
Other organizations that could be considered major players are SCF 
(US), Catholic Relief Services, World Vision and the Medecins sans 
Frontieres (MSF) organizations of France, Belgium and Holland. These are 
important because of the large amounts of resources they command and 
because of their ability to react quickly to new emergencies.
Other NGOs that have proven to be reliable and innovative in various 
emergencies are Lutheran World Federation, Lutheran World Relief and the 
Mennonite Central Committee.
There are many other organizations involved that provide a wide range 
of high-quality service. The aforementioned organizations, however, have 
tended to specialize in emergencies. Many have developed internal proce­
dures that facilitate quick response, and those in the first group have 
made many technical contributions adopted by other organizations.
F . Research Organizations
No list of key players in refugee emergencies would be complete 
without mentioning the research and technical assistance groups that have 
provided much of the impetus for improving emergency operations.
In the health sector, the most important and active groups are:
--- The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (the Ross
Institute) which carries out research and offers a wide range of 
training services;
--  The Center for Epidemiological Research in Disasters at Louvain,
Belgium; and
--- The School of International Public Health, Johns Hopkins
University.
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In the field of general research on emergencies, an important organi­
zation is the Relief & Development Institute (formerly the International 
Disaster Institute) in London. RDI focuses primarily on famine and food 
emergencies but also covers the entire spectrum of refugee emergencies as 
well as natural disasters. Their personnel have contributed much to the 
field of early warning and have evaluated the effectiveness of relief 
approaches used by governments and NGOs.
In the field of emergency management and in physical planning of 
refugee camps and settlements, the most active organization is INTERTECT. 
Based in Dallas, Texas, INTERTECT maintains one of the world’s largest 
libraries on emergency operations and fields consultants for a wide range 
of technical and management assistance.
In the field of training, the two most important organizations are the 
Disaster Management Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the 
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center at the Asia Institute of Technology in 
Bang- kok, Thailand. The DMC provides a wide range of correspondence 
courses aimed at emergency managers in governments and NGOs and is the 
prime contractor for the UNHCR Emergency Management Training Program. The 
ADPC focuses primarily on natural disasters, not refugees, but many of the 
general courses they provide are relevant to managing refugee emergencies.
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE RELIEF SYSTEM
Many of the problems in refugee assistance reflect a failure of the 
system as a whole rather than of specific organizations. It is important 
to understand these systemic problems if the overall delivery of services 
is to be improved.
A. Coordinat i on
Many problems occur because there is no real system. Each organiza­
tion has its own agenda, its own clientele and its own motivations for 
providing assistance. At the donor level, there are also political consi­
derations as well as economic considerations and constraints.
Nowhere are the economic considerations more evident than in a govern­
ment’s decision about the method for providing assistance. There are 
generally three options: to provide cash, to provide in-kind or commodity 
assistance, or to provide a line of credit for the relief agency to pur­
chase materials manufactured in the donor’s country. When governments 
choose either the second or third option, problems can occur, especially 
if the materials or commodities being provided do not meet requested 
specifications or needs at the field level. If the line-of-credit option 
is chosen, significant delays can occur between the time materials are 
ordered and the time they are delivered.
B. Gaps in the System
Significant gaps occur in the provision of relief services simply 
because the system itself is not comprehensive. As already mentioned, 
there is an over-concentration of health and feeding agencies while
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logistics, water and sanitation, engineering and other key elements 
required in an emergency are under-represented.
C. Funding
The most important obstacle to improving international relief assis­
tance is the question of funding. The nature of the system is such that 
an emergency must be in progress before funds can be raised. Few organi­
zations have large cash reserves that will permit them to respond as an 
emergency is developing or to order and pre-position materials and sup­
plies. It is often noted that agencies must have a picture of a "starving 
child” before they can raise money. Until funding mechanisms are devel­
oped that permit early response, and a general attitude prevails that 
encourages preparedness and rewards initiatives for taking pre-disaster 
actions, immediate response will be slowed and lives will continue to be 
lost.
D. Over-reliance on NGOs
The international system today is similar to that which evolved in the 
post-World War II period to assist refugees and displaced persons. Pri­
mary reliance then, and today, is on NGOs. Most donors prefer to channel 
their funds through NGOs, especially those headquartered in their coun­
tries. As mentioned, NGOs in general have a fairly limited scope and tend 
to focus on person-to-person activities rather than on comprehensive 
relief packages. While certainly helpful, NGOs will not close the gaps 
for they are unlikely to refocus their attention on engineering, physical 
planning and logistics. Until these areas are addressed, it will be 
impossible to put together a balanced package of assistance with mutually- 
supportive programs.
The answer to this problem is to place more emphasis on developing 
host country emergency management capabilities. In some countries, 
refugee agencies have become highly proficient and the gaps in service 
coverage are not as pronounced; in others, there has been scant attention 
paid to expanding their capabilities. So long as donors continue to focus 
their attention on NGOs, substantial gaps will remain.
E. Lack of Institutional Memory
One of the major obstacles to improving the performance of the inter­
national relief system is the lack of institutional memory either at the 
level of the individual agencies or collectively throughout the system.
The personnel fielded to work an emergency by NGOs have often been diver­
ted from other ongoing activities —  in most cases, development work.
They are later supplemented by volunteers from other places. Almost all 
are on a short-term basis; as soon as the emergency is over, they return 
to their regular jobs. It is rare for an individual to work in more than 
one emergency. Few people write about their experiences; even fewer 
professional analyses or evaluations of relief operations are conducted. 
Added to the fact that the system itself is a loose association of organi­
zations, this means that it is very difficult for lessons learned to be 
passed on from one operation to the next.
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F. Resentment of NGOs by Host Governments
Also a problem is the growing resentment of many host governments 
concerning the role of NGOs and. the preference of donors to support NGOs 
over the host country’s refugee agency. In some cases, an impasse has 
been created. Donors are reluctant to give additional funds to govern­
mental refugee organizations until they improve their performance, but the 
organizations cannot improve so long as most of the funding goes to NGOs.
Heightening the governments’ anxiety about NGOs is the fact that many 
operate independently with little coordination with a government’s 
refugee agency. In cases where governments are repressive or have not 
demonstrated a high degree of concern about the plight of refugees, it is 
understandable that the donors would continue to favor NGOs as the execu­
tors of their programs. Nonetheless, there has been a general system-wide 
disregard for developing strong refugee organizations and much of the 
assistance to NGOs has been at the expense of local governments. If the 
system is to improve, the capabilities of governments to deal with the 
problem must be improved.
EXERCISES
1. List the benefits of working through NGOs, noting their strengths and 
special capabilities.
2. List the disadvantages of working with NGOs, noting their specific 
weaknesses.
3. Using the needs matrix on the following page, identify the major areas 
where gaps are likely to occur in the provision of services, and 
recommend which type of organization should be strengthened in order 
to provide the services that are lacking.
4. List ways in which UNHCR could strengthen its ability to assist host 
governments in filling the typical gaps that occur in relief opera­
tions .
5. Make a list of those services or programs that are best carried out by 
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The purposes of this paper are:
1. to identify the first steps that need to be taken to gain control 
of an emergency, especially to reduce deaths;
2. to provide a conceptual framework for determining priorities;
3. to describe the interrelationships among the sets of problems 
that recur in emergencies;
4. to identify the interrelationships among various emergency 
responses and how they can be mutually supporting; and
5. to lay the groundwork for establishing response doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
A. Definition
Initial response is the term used to describe the first steps that 
need to be taken in responding to a developing emergency.
B. Conceptualizing Initial Response
The initial response to an emergency can be likened to the opening 
moves of a chess game. They are dictated as much by what we don't know 
about the situation as by what we do know about emergencies in general.
In a chess game, no matter what the players’ eventual strategy, pawns must 
be moved in order to create openings and flexibility of movement for the 
capital pieces. Likewise, in an emergency, certain moves must be made and 
certain systems must be established before other options can be brought 
into play. Usually, lives cannot be saved unless certain interrelated 
sets of activities are established immediately. Diseases cannot be 
controlled, for example, unless there is an adequate food supply. Food 
have little bearing unless people are free from diarrhea. Diarrhea 
cannot be prevented unless there is an adequate supply of clean water. 
Clean water depends on adequate sanitation and good hygiene practices.
Emergency response begins as soon as the first refugee crosses the 
border and should follow the following outline. At the same time, an 
assessment should take place. The information developed by the assessment 
is used to modify and adjust the response. Initial response should follow 
a prescribed pattern and continue until on—site assessments prove beyond a 
doubt that a specific set of interventions is not required. You always 
begin with these actions until the situation dictates otherwise.
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ir These opening moves are sets or combinations of complimentary, inter­
related, interdependent actions and programs. It is important to remember 
that one strategy often will not solve a particular problem; usually, the 
problem requires a concerted attack using several different approaches. 
Furthermore, one program can rarely accomplish its goals unless it is 
supported by programs in other sectors. For example, diarrhea cannot be 
solved solely by providing clean water. Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) 
plus sanitation and the establishment of good personal hygiene practices 
will also be important.
Research has shown that the primary killers in an emergency are malnu­
trition, measles and diarrhea. Each of these is related to the other. A 
child that is severely malnourished will not be able to survive a case of 
measles. Severe diarrhea can quickly dehydrate and kill a malnourished 
person or someone with measles. Therefore, in order to save lives, these 
three killers must be brought under control.
The three causes of mortality and their interrelationship are depicted 
theoretically in Figure 1.
The cornerstones of an effective response are food, immunization and 
diarrhea control which is carried out by providing clean water, oral 
rehydration and sanitation. The relationship of the responses to the 
primary causes of mortality are depicted in Figure 2 below.






These responses are the beginning of what is known as the initial 
response doctrine, sometimes more popularly known as a "get-well" 
program.* Each of these responses —  food, immunization, and diarrhea 
control —  requires a distinct set of activities.
A. Food Supply
In order to ensure that refugees can recover and maintain nutritional 
status, a three-pronged approach may be required. This includes provision 
of a general or basic ration, provision of supplementary food for special 
groups and, where medically required, therapeutic (or intensive) feeding 
for severely malnourished people.
1* General Ration. This is a general food distribution designed to 
give families enough food to regain and maintain normal body 
weight and nutritional status. Of all the food supplies in 
emergencies, the general ration is the most important. If it is 
possible to supply enough food so that the basic ration can be 
maintained without interruption, the vast majority of families 
can recover and survive on this food alone.
The general ration is made up of what is known as the "food 
basket": a mix of foods that is designed to provide a complete 
diet, a balance of calories, protein, vitamins and minerals. The 
primary requirements are:
a basic grain, oil, and a source of protein;
a minimum caloric content of 1800 kcals per day; and
a mix of vitamins (especially A), minerals and other 
nutrients to ensure healthy development of children.
The key to a successful general ration during the initial 
emergency is to supply enough food for people to survive without 
relying on supplementary sources. Usually, a general ration is 
planned on the basis of giving every member of the family the 
requirements needed for an adult. This permits families to 
apportion the food according to nutritional needs and provides a 
small buffer within the family’s supply.
The ration should be distributed at regular intervals in order to 
build confidence and reduce hoarding.
* The term "get-well program" was coined by Arthur E. Dewey, Deputy High 
Commissioner for Refugees, then serving as Under Secretary of State for 
Refugee Affairs. The term was applied to the efforts to control high 
mortality rates in the 1985 Sudanese refugee crisis.
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a) Distribution: Distributions should be made at approximately
ten-day intervals throughout the emergency. This reduces 
the likelihood that malnourished people who over-consume 
will not have enough food between the time they run out and 
the next distribution. Longer intervals will result in 
higher mortality.
b) Milling: Grains should be milled in the camp. Milling at
the camp level reduces losses in transit and often means 
that a greater portion of the nutrients can be retained 
(especially in rice). Milling in the camp can also provide 
work for refugees, and it enables them to store the food 
longer in the home. If free milling facilities are not 
provided, the refugees are likely to trade a portion of 
their grains for milling.
c) Registration: Unless an adequate registration program is
developed and instituted immediately, major disparities in 
food distribution will occur quickly.
2. Supplementary Feeding. Supplementary feeding is a targeted
distribution of food designed to help those who are malnourished 
or have special nutritional needs to regain their nutritional 
status. A supplementary feeding program should be carried out:
--- anytime malnutrition is high (over 10% of the under 5s), and
--  anytime there is evidence that inter-family food distribu­
tion problems are occurring that cannot be corrected by 
other means.
There are two ways to carry out supplementary feeding programs. 
One is to supply special supplementary foods to the target popu­
lations (normally women and children under 5). The other is to 
conduct special supplementary feeding programs at "sit-down" 
meals where the target populations come to centers daily to 
receive specially-prepared meals and consume them on the spot.
Of the two programs, the latter is usually the most effective in 
the early stages of an emergency. However, it is only as effec­
tive as the outreach efforts made by the staff to identify those 
most in need and to enroll them in the program.
The components of a supplementary feeding program are:
a) on-the-spot feeding of prepared foods.
b) weighing and measuring of children to ensure that they are
gaining weight. (Note: middle upper arm circumference
(MUAC) measurements are used for rapid in-camp surveys to 
qualify children for the supplementary feeding program; once 
they are enrolled at a center, they are measured using 
weight-for-height standards.)
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c) immunization. All children entering the supplementary 
feeding program should be immunized against the primary 
childhood diseases (measles, DPT, etc.).
d) surveillance. In the initial stages of an emergency, the 
routine monitoring that is carried out at the supplementary 
feeding center may be the best means of determining other 
health and nutritional problems in refugee populations. By 
monitoring diarrhea in children and noting where the people 
live in the camp or settlement, it is usually possible to 
identify impure sources of water. By noting women or chil­
dren that do not gain weight despite supplementary feeding, 
problems can often be detected within the general ration or 
inter-family distribution. The use of supplementary feeding 
programs to spot other health problems is known as a 
"nutrition-centered health" approach.
The key to a successful supplementary feeding program is 
outreach. Health workers must go into the population, identify 
women and children that require supplementary feeding, and ensure 
that they are enrolled in (and regularly attend) the supplemen­
tary feeding program. Without outreach, supplementary feeding 
will have only a minimal impact.
3• Therapeutic (Intensive) Feeding. In recent years, therapeutic 
feeding programs have attracted much criticism from epidemiolo­
gists who note that few children survive despite the best efforts 
of medical staff. Therapeutic feeding requires that special 
facilities be established (normally attached to an outpatient 
dispensary or hospital). It also requires a special staff to 
monitor round-the-clock feeding.
As a general rule, therapeutic feeding programs should be given a 
low priority in relation to other food and nutrition efforts and 
should only be established after supplementary feeding is under­
way. Remember, in an emergency the goal is to save as many 
people as possible, and efforts must be focused on keeping people 
from deteriorating to a point where only radical interventions 
such as therapeutic feeding are necessary.
4* Indirect Food Supply. In many emergencies, relief agencies
propose indirect means of increasing food supplies for refugees. 
These can include food-for-work, cash-for-work and other indirect 
approaches. In an emergency, these should receive a low priority 
and be viewed only as minimal supplements to the families1 food 
supplies. After an emergency has passed and other sources of 
food are well-established, indirect food approaches may be 
initiated —  but only after careful planning and targeting.
B. Vaccination Programs
Vaccinations to prevent communicable diseases, especially measles, are 
the second component of a get-well program. In order to be successful, a
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vaccination program requires:
--- surveillance and detection of communicable diseases;
--- vaccines; and
a cold chain to ensure efficacy of the vaccine from the point of 
origin to the time of injection.
In recent years, major efforts have been made to build adequate sup­
plies of vaccines in all Third World countries. The Expanded Program of 
Immunization (EPI) spearheaded by UNICEF and the World Health Organization 
has resulted in stockpiles of many of the most important medicines used in 
emergencies and this has greatly reduced response times. With the esta­
blishment of EPI warehouses, there is no reason why effective immunization 
campaigns cannot be carried out from the very outset of most emergencies.
A vital component is maintaining a cold chain from the EPI warehouse 
to the refugee camp. Specially-designed and dedicated cold boxes for 
transferring vaccines, refrigeration equipment, and adequate stores of 
fuel at the destination are required.
C. Diarrhea Control
Diarrhea control consists of both preventative and curative 
activities. Preventative actions focus on the relationship between clean 
water, sanitation and hygiene —  a relationship known as the "hygiene 
loop , illustrated below in Figure 3. Anywhere contamination occurs 
within this loop, diarrhea will result.
Figure 3
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Curative actions focus on oral rehydration therapy (ORT), a simple 
solution of sugar, salt, bicarbonate of soda and water that helps restore 
the body’s electrolyte balance and effectively reduces dehydration. In 
the long term, it is more effective than most costly anti-diarrheal medi­
cines .
Use of oral rehydration solution (ORS) is becoming more widespread 
each year. In some countries, the packets are so commonplace that they 
are even used for curing hang-overs!
There are numerous sources for ORS packets. They are usually included 
in the standard medical kits provided by UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF and many 
private voluntary organizations. Large stores of ORS packets are often on 
hand at the EPI warehouses, and they are commercially available in a 
growing number of countries. In a situation where supplies are inade­
quate, it is possible to make the solution from the basic ingredients.
The formula is depicted below.
Oral Rehydration Solution
Sodium Chloride (Table Salt) 3.5 Grams
Sodium Bicarbonate (Baking Soda) 2.5 Grams
Potassium Chloride 1.5 Grains
Glucose 20.0 Grams
To be mixed with one liter of clean water
Figure 4
The relationship between water and sanitation dictates that they must 
be considered together with the physical site and environment of a refugee 
camp or settlement. Since water sources can easily be contaminated, 
especially by poor drainage and the poor siting of sanitary facilities, 
waste disposal, etc., the physical location, topography and layout are 
very important factors. The position of roads and drains is important 
since roads can serve as small levies or dams and the areas alongside a 
road usually serve as drains. To an extent, shelters —  especially their 
arrangement, size and spatial relationship to latrines —  must also be 
considered. Locating latrines far from from the shelter areas will reduce 
the likelihood that they will be used. Latrine design and provision for 
maintenance and cleaning must also be taken into consideration.
D. Logistics
Now that the three primary sets of interrelated activities have been 
identified, it is time to link them with one final activity; logistics. 
The delivery of food, medicines, materials, and even movement of the
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refugees themselves, all are dependent upon logistics. Unless" an 
effective logistics system is established from the very outset, it will be 
impossible to implement the other three sets of activities smoothly.
SUMMARY
In order to successfully control an emergency, the initial response 
must move forward and in unison along set lines. All the activities 
mentioned above are interrelated and interdependent. If these programs 
are implemented swiftly and backed by a sound logistics system, lives can 
be saved and a base can be laid for a balanced and effective assistance 
program.
EXERCISES
1. Identify the types of staff that are required to carry out an initial 
response.
2. Make a preparedness checklist of the activities that need to be 
carried out in the forward planning phase in order to successfully 
implement an initial response.
3. Make a list of the types of things that should be carried out in a 




The purposes of this paper are to:
® Identify the impact of sanitation on health.
© Discuss the principal technical factors.
© Describe some practical emergency solutions.
® Propose a practical approach to sanitation problems.
INTRODUCTION.
Sanitation is the protection of public health, especially by the removal of 
wastes. The components of sanitation are the disposal of waste water, faecal 
matter and household waste. Sanitation also includes personal and communal 
hygiene.
Sanitation and water supply are complementary activities and are often linked 
together. Providing good sanitation is more complex and more expensive than 
supplying water. While two hundred or even five hundred people may be 
willing to use the same water point they could not use the same latrine.
Defecation and personal hygiene are private matters in many societies. Most 
societies have special rules for defecation that restrict the potential for rapid 
change in defecation habits and patterns. The sanitation practices that people 
normally use may be inappropriate for their circumstances in an emergency.
Sanitation in often put on the long finger in emergencies because of these 
problems. The results of lacking food or water are soon obvious. The effects 
of poor sanitation are far less obvious and take longer to appear. Sanitation 
is, unlike health or water supply, not photogenic. It is often very difficult to 
find an agency willing to take responsibility for sanitation.
Hygiene education is central to sanitation because it may be necessary to 
change peoples’ attitudes. This paper will discuss the general technical 





Traditionally, the link between sanitation, water, education and health is 
shown as a triangle. This tringle shows that all three components are 
necessary for good health.
Health Education
Water Sanitation
This should emphasise that building efficient latrines is not enough to 
guarantee good health in a camp. Sanitation protects public health through 
removing waste. Why is this necessary?
Many of important diseases that people have can be spread 
through their faeces. Many of these diseases spread when 
people eat or drink something contaminated by faeces.
This is known as faecal-oral disease transmission.
Diarrhoeas are often the biggest killers of the under-fives 
in a stable situation. Epidemics of cholera may kill large 
numbers of people in emergencies. All the diseases on the 
right cause human suffering and may cause death.
It is important to break the faecal-oral transmission chain 
by which the faeces of one person infects another who may go on in turn to 











proper faecal disposal plays the greatest part.
Faecal disposal is only aspect of sanitation. It is also necessary to avoid 
creating breeding sites for rats, flies or mosquitoes. All these pests may carry 
disease. Flies are a particular nuisance as they often play a part in the faecal- 
oral transmission of disease. Drainage, fly control and the disposal of solid 
waste all help to limit pests.
A further aspect of sanitation is ensuring that the conditions under which 
people live do not themselves create disease risks. Respiratory infections 
spread quickly in damp overcrowded conditions.
Drainage is the first topic discussed below as it is an aspect of sanitation 
which is often forgotten. Poor drainage may lead to the flooding of housing 
or latrines and the creation of breeding sites for mosquitoes.
DRAINAGE
Many refugee emergencies occur in tropical countries with distinct wet and 
dry seasons. The refugees may arrive at a site during the dry season and it 
is only with the coming of the rains that drainage problems begin to show up. 
The refugees’ tents may be inundated with water and their food rations and 
few remaining possessions destroyed.
There is noting unusual about the above scenario. It is frequently repeated. 
Rural people use their knowledge of their surroundings to site their buildings 
and villages. In an emergency, people may either have no information about 
the site, or have no choice in their location. Problems with drainage are often 
the result.
Drainage problems can be divided into three types, flooding, rainfall and 
waste-water. Rainwater flowing from uphill or watercourses overflowing 
their banks can cause flooding problems on a site. Rainfall problems occur 
when no thought is given to removing rainwater that falls on the site. Waste- 
water drainage problems often occur around water points, washing slabs and 
similar facilities.
Sensible site selection prevents flooding problems. The best sites are those 
on a slight slope. Always look at any signs of erosion on the site. Signs of 
soil erosion suggest that diversion ditches are needed to prevent too much
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water flowing through the camp. rThe construction of the camp itself may 
lead to flooding. This is particularly the case with roads that have neither 
drains nor culverts to allow water to flow across the road line.
Sites on the banks of rivers or streams face not only the risk of erosion but 
also risk uncontrolled fouling and use of surface water. It is better to site the 
camp at a safe distance and place a safe water supply between the camp and 
the river.
There is a temptation to site camps in natural clearings in uncleared bush. Be 
aware that these may be at natural low points. These areas are clear of 
bushes as standing water kills them off in the wet season.
The need for drainage of rain water is not always appreciated. There is 
usually little vegetation in camps and the ground is often compactd by the 
constant passage of people. This leads to only a small part of the rain which 
falls infiltrating into the ground. Most of it runs off leading to drainage 
problems. If the ground is very sandy and rainfall is light there may be no 
need for drainage. Even sandy soils contain some clay and tropical rainfall 
is intense. A rule of thumb is that you will need drainage for any site where 
crops can be grown.
The design of drains is more 
complicated than can be adequately 
dealt with in this paper. Surface 
drains are the only appropriate ones.
Some small culverts and footbridges 
may be needed for crossing the 
drains. Drains also need to be 
cleaned.
The types of drains used for soil 
conservation projects are very suitable 
for the main drains. The sketch on 
the right shows a drain suitable for 
emergency use when a proper design 
is not possible. Wide drains like this 
are best as they need little cleaning and area easy to cross. They can be 
rapidly constructed by a grader or by labour. The drains can form part of the 
firebreaks necessary in any camp.
Dimensions for Emergency Drains
------------------Drain 4rri wide-
Marimum Drain Length: 250m in sandy soils or 400m in clay soils. 
Drain slope: 1:25a
Drain spacing: Every 60m generally but every 30m on slopes over 250. 
Area drained by each drain: A maximum of ?.5Ha.
Drains should carry water to a natural water course or other waterway.
This drain is for emergency use only. Where possible contact the Soil 
Conservation officer ot the Ministry of Agriculture who will be able to 
design drains to suit your specific site.
o
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The local ministry of agriculture soil conservation technician should be able 
to help with the design of a drainage system. Your technical staff or 
consultants may also be able to help you.
Natural drainage, soakaways, seepage lines, evaporation ponds and 
evapotranspiration beds can dispose of waste water. With natural drainage 
waste water flows through a pipe or channel to a natural water course. This 
is the best option if the water is not polluted.
If the water contains grease a grease trap should be used. This is a simple 
baffle immersed in the water that holds back the floating grease while the 
water flows underneath. Kitchen waste water always needs a grease-trap to 
avoid clogging soakaways. Grease clogs the side of soakaways and seepage 
drains and prevents evaporation from ponds.
Soakaways are holes in the ground filled with rubble or large stones. The 
holes are normally about 1.2m square by 1.2m deep. Water soaks away 
through the side of the pit. The stones and rubble are there to keep the pit in 
shape.
Seepage drains are an alternative to soakaways. Trenches are dug about 2m 
apart and up to lm deep. Agricultural drains are laid, surrounded by sand or 
gravel towards the top of the trenches. A trench of this depth will, in average 
conditions, dispose of 20 litres per metre of trench per day. In good 
conditions the system will work without a deep trench. Twenty metres of 
seepage system will replace one large soakage pit.
Evaporation ponds can be used in very warm conditions in heavy clay soils 
with very poor drainage. The waste water ponded on the surface of the 
ground and it evaporates. The pond should be open to the sun and the wind. 
The ponds typically lose 6 to 8 litres per square of pond per day. Evaporation 
ponds may become insect breeding sites. Putting oil on the pond to control 
mosquitoes will reduce evaporation to one or two l/m2/day.
Evapotranspiration beds are areas supplied by surface or subsurface irrigation 
with plants growing overhead. Water flows on the surface or through a drain 
in a buried bed of gravel or sand. The buried bed may be sealed on top with 
a plastic membrane overlain by 300mm of soil. The crops growing on top of 
the beds use the water for their growth. Bananas, Eucalyptus and grasses 
grow well in these conditions. Plants growing in surface beds must be water 
tolerant.
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Evapotranspiration beds can dispose of 7 to 10 l/m2/day. Percolation losses 
into the ground may be more than evaporation or transpiration losses. 
Percolation can be improved marginally by placing gravel filled seepage 
trenches under the beds.
LATRINES
Latrines are often the largest single problem in the management of camps. It 
is common to find refugee camps littered with human faeces, especially those 
of children and to find latrines dirty, smelly, and overflowing. Clouds of flies 
are everywhere to be seen and diarrhoeal diseases are common. Why are 
failures in this area of camp management so common?
The chief reason probably lies in the differences between peoples’ normal 
environment and their environment in a refugee camp. In many countries 
most people in rural areas may not have latrines. People may defecate in 
areas of shelter such as wood lots instead of using latrines. Such practices, 
although not ideal, probably pose no major problems in well dispersed rural 
settlements. In a crowded camp such practices can, literally, be deadly.
Beliefs and conventions about defecation are part of all societies. Defecation 
is generally a private matter and it made be rude to discuss defecation 
practices. Any sanitation solution adopted must be culturally appropriate to the 
people. It is very foolish to embark on any sanitation program without 
extensive consultation with the users.
Latrines can be divided into wet, chemical and dry systems. Wet systems use 
water to transport sewerage away from the latrine. The Water Closets with 
which we are all familiar is an example of the wet system. Chemical latrines 
break down the sewage with strong chemicals. Dry toilets are systems that 
use no water or chemicals for their operation.
Wet latrines can be connected to a sewerage system or to a septic tank. They 
are unsuitable for emergency use because of the time taken to install these 
systems and the huge costs involved. Wet systems use large amounts of water 
for flushing. Pour-flush latrines are a cross between wet and dry systems. 
Flushing these latrines uses small amounts of water that the users pour by 
hand from a small container. Otherwise they are exactly the same as a dry 
system and will be treated below as a dry system variant.
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Chemical system use buckets that need to be emptied every few days. They 
should not be confused with the dry night soil system where buckets of 
untreated waste are removed daily. The chemicals used are both toxic and 
expensive. Chemical systems are unsuitable for emergency use because of the 
costs and of the difficulty of disposing of the toxic waste.
Dry systems are commonly used in emergencies. They cost less to build than 
wet or chemical systems and their operating cost is lower. Dry systems 
provide adequate protection for health and are used throughout the developing 
world.
The type of latrine most suitable for emergencies is the pit latrine in its 
various forms. It is easy and relatively quick to construct and needs no water 
for its operation. The basic pit latrine may be replaced by a pour flush 
latrine, which uses small amounts of water, where this is the cultural norm. 
A variant of the pit latrine is the Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine (VIP 
latrine).
Latrines are expensive. In development programs it is common to estimate 
the cost of providing latrines to be ten times the cost of water supply. This 
figure may seem excessive until one considers the amount of material needed 
for the latrine shelter. Each latrine can only serve a small number of people. 
A water point may serve 200 people, whereas a latrine cannot serve more than 
50.
The time taken to build latrines is a bigger constraint than their cost. A team 
of 4 skilled latrine builders may only produce two basic latrines of a basic 
type per week. Latrines may take a long time to build because of the many 
resources that they consume.
The cost of latrines and the time they take to build have led to the 
development of many expedient options. These range from the defecation 
field, through to the borehole latrine. All these options are temporary 
solutions only. In the longer term only VIP or pour-flush latrines are likely 
to prove suitable. The figures given alongside each latrine are estimates and 
the actual values will vary both with soil conditions and the customs of the 
people concerned.
In the initial phases of an emergency in a hot dry climate defecation fields 
may be used. Defecation fields are open areas close to the camp reserved for 
defecation. The theory is that the high temperatures in a dry climate rapidly
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dry the faeces and kill any eggs or pathogenic bacteria in it. Defecation fields 
have preformed very poorly and may help to spread disease rather than 
control it.
In practice defecation fields are filthy foul smelling areas littered with human 
faeces. The area reserved for defecation grows quickly as people attempt to 
avoid the faeces of others. The faeces remain moist for some time at their 
centre and both eggs and pathogens survive. People do not use the field at 
night because of the risk of stepping on something unpleasant. The first rain 
that comes reaps a huge cargo of parasites and pathogens that can be carried 
to parts of the camp. Defecation fields should not be used for emergencies. 
A Defecation furrows can be used instead in the first stages of an emergency.
A defecation furrow is simply a furrow 
reserved for defecation. Each day workers 
dig a new furrow and cover over and 
compress the old one. This can be done by 
labour or by a tractor fitted with a mould 
board plough and a tamping roller. The 
furrows must be well compacted to prevent 
fly maggots from burrowing to the surface.
Some defecation often take place in front of 
the furrow and this must be swept into the furrow before closing the furrow. 
The furrows should be placed so that they advance towards the camp as they 
are filled in.
Shallow trench latrines are the next simplest 
option. These may be simple trenches or 
may be fitted with boards on each side. The 
users may throw some soil to cover their 
faeces and a layer of soil is placed on the 
trenches at night. The shallow trench latrines 
have a life of 3 days. Screens supported on 
poles surround groups of 5 parallel trenches 
to give some measure of privacy.
Both the defecation furrow and the shallow trench latrine have odour and fly 
control problems. Flies are a bigger problem with the shallow trench latrine. 
These facilities must be located downwind of the camp. Defecation furrows 
offer no privacy while shallow trenches offer some limited privacy. They are 
both reasonable emergency measures but must be replaced by durable
Shallow Trench LatrineWidth: 0.3m
Depth: 0.6m
Trench length: 1. OmLife: 3 days
Per 1000 persons:
Length needed: 40. OmDaily land take : 19.0m2
Daily length: 13.3m
Defecation Furrow
Width: 0.5mDepth: 0.2mTrench length: 200mLife: 1 daylPer 1000 persons:Length needed: 100mDaily land take : 60m2
Daily length: 100m
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solutions as quickly as possible.
Deep trench latrines have a row of seats or 
squatting plates placed over the trench. Each 
trench has five seats or squat plates. The 
latrines offer a reasonable degree of privacy 
in that plastic sheet or other washable 
screening material separate the individual 
positions. The compartments are open to an 
alleyway at the front. A partition screens this 
alley from the rest of the camp, providing
privacy. Accidents must be cleaned quickly to avoid excessive smells. 
Covers may be placed on the squat holes or seats to minimise smells.





Per 1000 persons: 
Length needed: 32.0m
Daily land take: 2.4m2
Daily length: 0.3m
Deep trench latrines consume a good deal of resources and skilled time. 
Roofs stop rain filling the latrines prematurely or weakening the trench sides. 
The top 0.6m of the sides of the trench needs to be supported in most ground 
conditions. In very poor ground the whole depth of the trench may need to 
be supported.
The pit latrine is similar to a trench latrine 
except that it has just a single position. The 
hole in a pit latrine can be any depth but is 
usually between 0.8 and 1.2m square. As the 
total volume of excavation per person for a 
pit latrine is larger the life of pit latrines is 
far greater than for a trench latrine. The pit 
latrine can also be fitted with a squatting plate
with a water seal. Water, poured by hand, flushes the waste material from 
the plate. The pit latrine is then a pour flush latrine.
Pit Latrines 
Width and length: 1.0m 
Depth: 3.0m
Life: 3 years
Per 1000 persons: 
Number needed: 40
Daily land take: 0.2m2
Yearly number: 14
The life of a pour flush latrine is probably two thirds that of an equivalent dry 
pit latrine. Pour flush latrines can also be built with the pit offset from the 
squatting plate. In this way one pit can serve 4 latrines. This type often has 
more maintenance problems than the simple type.
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Borehole latrines are simply holes bored into 
the ground fitted with a seat or squatting 
cover. The holes are dug by hand auger or 
by a truck mounted auger. A can with ends 
cut off or a pipe supports the top 0.6m of the 
borehole. Holes are normally augered in 
sets of five and fitted with screens similar to 
a deep trench latrine. Roofs are not needed 
but are often fitted.
Deep trench, pit and borehole latrines all have fly and odour problems. 
Odours are less noticeable than with furrows or shallow trenches, especially 
when seats and squat plates are provided with covers. Fly control of deep 
trench and pit latrines can be improved by hanging hessian soaked in sump oil 
or insecticide in the trenches. These latrines offer a reasonable degree of 
privacy. Doors can be fitted but this is not recommended as they can lead to 
the build up of odour inside the structure driving away users.
The life of a latrine depends on the soil conditions, the size of the latrine hole 
and the number of people using it. Human beings produce about 0.1 litres of 
dry solid waste per day. Human waste contains a lot of water, making the 
total initial volume of the waste much higher. In a pit latrine the water 
gradually evaporates and seeps into the ground leaving only the solid material 
in its place.
The calculations above assume that seepage is slow and that 0.3 litres of 
latrine volume is needed per person per day. A figure of 0.1 litres per person 
per day is appropriate for a latrine life of over one year. The bacteria in the 
latrine help to separate water from the solids. If chlorine or other chemicals 
are used to kill microorganisms in latrines they will shorten the useful life of 
the latrine. Lime and ashes or ground charcoal can be used to reduce odours 
from pit latrines.
If a latrine fills quickly there is not enough time for the water to evaporate or 
to seep into the soil. This can happen when a lot of people use the latrine or 
chemicals are used in it. The latrine may only hold one sixth of its total 
potential capacity in these circumstances.
The above calculations were based on 25 persons per latrine. This is a 
reasonable level of provision considering the prevalence of diarrhoeas in warm 





Per 1000 persons: 
Number needed: 40
Daily land take: 2.0m2Daily number: 0.4
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cleanliness and a higher level of utilisation. If latrines are provided on, the 
basis of one per 50 persons the latrine lifetimes above given should be divided 
by three.
Ventilated improved pit 
latrines are pit latrines that 
are fitted with a vent pipe. 
The sun heats up the vent 
pipe. The air in the vent 
pipe rises up and is replaced 
by air flowing from the pit. 
If there is wind, the wind 
blowing across the top of 
the vent pipe also draws the 
air from the pit. This air 
carries the latrine odours 
with it leaving the inside of 
the latrine fresh.
The inside of the latrine is 
dark. Flies go towards the 
light from the vent and fly 
up it. The fly screen stops 
them for leaving until they 
tire and fall back into the 
pit. Other flies attracted by 
the odour of the latrine vent
Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine
Odour laden air leaving pipe
(heated in vent pipe and drawn by wind)
Vent pipe 
heated by sun




top of vent pipe
cannot get in.
Ventilated improved pit latrines are not suitable for use on trenches unless the 
trench is divided into a series of separate pits. In unidvided trenches air 
enters one hole and leaves by another, bringing all the odour with it. Plastic 
sheet can be used to separate the pits.
Urinals for men can decrease the demand on latrines. The urinals can be built 
on the same principle as a ventilated improved pit latrine or can be built using 
one of the many patterns used by the military.
There are many other types of latrine but the above types describe those likely 
to be used in an emergency. Ventilated improved pit latrines and pour-flush 
latrines are suitable for general use in long term settlements.
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The water table and the location of housing and other facilities controls latrine 
location. Of these constraints the water table constraint is the more serious. 
Latrines must not pollute ground water sources. Latrine pits must not extend 
into the water table. The bottom of a pit should be at least 2m above the top 
of the water table. Latrines should not be within 100m of a well, spring, 
borehole or surface water source. The direction in which latrines face may 
be sensitive in muslim countries.
In areas with a high water table, latrines may be 
built in raised mounds. A better solution is to use 
the OXFAM sanitation unit. Each unit will serve 
a population of one thousand people. The 
sanitation pack has 20 squatting plates and a 
treatment unit. The effluent from the treatment 
unit presents little or no biological hazard.
The sanitation unit is particularly suitable for use
in emergencies for the treatment of the wastes of patients with faecal-oral 
epidemic diseases. The purchase of a sanitation unit is recommended where 
outbreaks of cholera or other faecal-oral epidemics are expected.
As noted above, defecation fields and other latrine expedients must be located 
downwind of all accommodation. Ventilated improved pit latrines and pour 
flush latrines can be placed throughout the accommodation blocks. Ventilated 
pit latrines remove the smell from the latrine locality, but may shift a reduced 
smell to another point. The higher the vent pipe the further the smell moves 
and the more it dilutes. Pour-flush latrines sometimes spell because the gasses 
formed in the pit push their way past the water seal.
The great advantage that ventilated, and pour flush latrines have is odour 
control. When properly maintained, the smell from them is low enough to 
allow them to be located near housing. Any type of latrine will smell if it is 
not properly maintained and kept clean.
As a rule every house should be within 100m of a latrine. If houses are 
further away then there will be some uncontrolled defecation, particularly by 
small children.
OXFAM
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MANAGING A LATRINE PROGRAM
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The best resource available to anyone responsible for sanitation is the people 
themselves. People will take any hygenic measure if they are consulted and 
are themselves convinced of the need to do so. Sanitarians needs to know 
how the community perceives its sanitation problems before they can offer 
appropriate advice. This is one reason why community participation is vital 
in latrine programs.
The most important principle with latrine programs is that the practices they 
promote must be culturally appropriate and acceptable to the users. Sanitation 
may not be seen as a problem by the community in the same way that 
outsiders see it. The communities experience may reinforce their current 
practices.
Different cultures use different methods of anal cleansing. Cleansing 
materials appropriate to the population should be provided at latrine sites. 
This can take the form of small water tins and a water drum for some 
cultures. Water for hand-washing should be provided always.
Emergencies are associated with overcrowding and poor physical condition. 
People may not realise that these factors place them at special risk and make 
their hygiene habits inappropriate to their new condition. Sometimes the 
people at risk may be very aware that they are at risk but may not have the 
resources to reduce the risks.
While constructing latrines is not particularly difficult, maintaining them is. 
Latrine systems only work if they are used. They will only be used if they 
are accepted by the community and are convenient.
If latrines are dirty or far from accommodation, they will soon fall into 
disuse. Latrine cleaning is always difficult. Latrine cleaning is not a 
prestigious job in any culture. Communal latrines need paid cleaners of some 
sort or they soon become dirty.
While using paid cleaners is acceptable in the initial stages of an emergency 
it is generally not a viable practice in the long term. For long term 
settlements it is better to move to family latrines. Family latrines are the only 
ones that will be kept clean without outside inducements.
Latrine guards may be used during an emergency. These ensure that people 
do not defecate outside the latrines and that the latrines are clean. Guards can 
also supervise hand washing by latrine users. Several latrines can be placed
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in a fenced compound with a guard and hand washing facilities near the 
entrance. The guard obliges everyone to wash their hands after using the 
latrine. Making cleaning the latrines a small part of a responsible task often 
makes the task more acceptable.
WASTE DISPOSAL
Every group of people, no matter how poor, will generate solid waste. In the 
initial stages of an emergency the amount of solid waste generated can be very 
small as people have literally noting to throw away. After a short time the 
amount of discarded material begins to build up. If such material is not 
collected flies and rats will live on it and breed in it.
Making allowance for waste disposal must part of all programs in the camp. 
If new clothing is issued allowance must be made for the collection of 
discarded clothing.
The amount of waste generated depends on the type of rations people receive 
and on how they are packaged. If a camp is supplied by a central kitchen 
most of the waste will be uneaten food and kitchen waste. If dry rations are 
issued there will be more packaging waste and less food waste. With long 
term settlements there will be more waste and it will be very varied.
In emergencies the proper disposal may not be a priority for the community. 
Refuse collection must be simple and straight-forward. Oil drums (2001 size) 
fitted with handles and lids can be sited around the camp for refuse collection. 
Placing the drums on a gravel bed with a small surround prevents dirt from 
building up around the drum site. In countries with a plastics industry refuse 
bins to a municipal standard can be half the price of empty oil drums.
The drum sites should be next to roads in the camp. A tractor and trailer can 
collect the drums daily and take then to a dump site. It may be possible to 
find a contractor to remove the refuse from the site. Otherwise the rubbish 
can be buried in a pit, with layers of rubbish covered with top soil each day. 
Using plastic sacks to line the drums or bins makes the whole operation much 
cleaner.
In a settled site the amount of refuse can be between 0.3kg and 1.0 kg/person 
per day with a volume between 0.8 and 2.5 litres. In emergencies the levels 
of refuse will be less than this. Bins should be provided to cope with between
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1 and 2 litres per person per day. One 200 litre refuse drum will cater for 
between 100 and 200 people.o
Incinerators can burn combustible rubbish. Incinerators can be built to a wide 
range of patterns. Incinerators consist of a fire box, grate and vent. 
Incinerators are often used for burning waste from hospitals and health 
centres.
Waste from hospitals and health centres is particularly dangerous and should 
be dealt with separately from the household refuse. It should be incinerated 
or buried on site in plastic sites. Burial pits for hospital waste should be 
protected from flooding.
As mentioned above, the OXFAM sanitation unit is particularly suitable for 
dealing with waste from patients during epidemics of faecal oral diseases. Pit 
latrines can also be used for this material but additional measures should be 
taken for fly control. It is particularly improtant to protect these latrines 
flooding.
FLY CONTROL
If a camp is not clean flies will very quickly become a major problem. Flies 
can be controlled by insecticidal application, trapping, exclusion or by 
denying them breeding and feeding sites.
All the flies in the camp can be knocked-down by an insecticidal fog. This 
technique should only be used in expert hands. Checks should be made to 
establish resistance to the insecticide used. A fogging machine is used to 
apply a blanket of insecticidal fog about 2m deep across the camp. The 
fogging needs to be repeated every 10 days to control flies.
Some areas need special fly protection. Kitchens, health centres and feeding 
centres need special protection. Persistent insecticides can be sprayed on 
vertical surfaces to limit the spread of infection by flies. Expert advice should 
be sought on resistance and to avoid any risk to health. The now 
unfashionable sticky fly paper traps are very effective. The ultra violet fly 
electrocutors popular in developed countries only work where there is little 
daylight. Flies are just as happy with the ultra violet component of daylight.
Better control of flies can be obtained by denying them feeding and breeding
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sites. A single unventilated pit latrine can produce over 100,000 flies a year. 
The use of ventilated improved pit latrines can reduce these numbers by more 
than 98%. Efficient garbage disposal also helps to control flies. Using 
plastic refuse sacks also helps control files. Buried refuse should be covered 
with compacted layers of earth. The top layer of earth on a pit should be at 
least 0.6m thick.
Kitchens should be fly-screened and staff trained to reduce opportunities for 
flies. Used utensils should be quickly cleaned. Food and utensils should be 
stored in screened stores. A mesh size of 2.2mm will exclude flies.
MOSQUITO CONTROL AND MALARIA
Malaria is often a major problem in camps. It is particularly dangerous when 
a population that is not resistant to malaria is exposed to it in their area of 
refuge. Malaria can be combatted by chemical prophylaxis, insecticidal 
spaying, avoiding contact with the mosquitoes spreading it or by destroying 
their breeding sites. A mixture of techniques will give the best result.
Chemical prophylaxis may be appropriate for population with no resistance to 
malaria. This is a matter for medical staff to decide on and will not be 
discussed further.
Mosquitoes rest on walls of houses and these walls can be sprayed with a long 
lasting insecticide to kill the mosquitoes. Mosquitoes are now resistant to 
many insecticides and expert advice is needed before embarking on a general 
spraying program. Remember that most of the negative environmental impact 
of insecticides has come from their agricultural use. Public health use 
represents only a tiny fraction of the total quantity of insecticides used.
The use of screens and bed nets to prevent mosquitoes biting is very effective, 
especially if the nets contain a long lasting insecticide. Many species that 
carry malaria are most active at dawn and at dusk. Some species may prefer 
cattle or other animals. Cattle do not get malaria and may be used to offer 
alternative targets for the mosquitoes. The widespread introduction of cattle 
may have lead to the southward retreat of malaria in europe in the last few 
hundred years.
Mosquitoes hatch their eggs in water. Different species prefer different types 
of sites. Sanitation measures are normally carried out within a 2km radius of
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the camp. All standing water within the camp should either be screened or 
treated by pouring oil or kerosene on it. This forms a thin layer on the 
surface preventing mosquito larvae from breathing air. Any pools of water 
in the camp area should be filled in or drained.
Every mosquito strain had different environmental preferences. Only a few 
strains carry malaria. Sanitation measures are most effective if they target 
these strains, but public support may be greatest if all strains are attacked. 
It may be appropriate to seek the advice of an entomologist before embarking 
on a large scale program.
PERSONAL HYGIENE
The perceptions of what is clean vary from culture to culture. Cleanliness 
comes naturally to people and when they have the opportunity to wash, they 
do so within the constraints of their culture. Cleanliness may play a large part 
in morale. If people cannot wash themselves this may damage their sense of 
their own worth and lead to other problems.
If there is surface water within walking distance many people may go there 
to wash. It is important that this happens downstream of any water- 
abstraction points. Where pollution is not acceptable it may be necessary to 
build showers for the community.
Showers may also be needed for urban refugees or where there is no access 
to safe surface water. These can be either individual or communal depending 
on cultural acceptance. Showers can use large amounts of water. The 
number of showers to be provided depends on the background of the people 
but a figure of between 2 and 10 per thousand people may be appropriate.
If water is limited and living conditions are crowded it may be appropriate to 
provide washing booths where people can bring a small amount of water and 
wash themselves in private. All washing booths and showers should be fitted 
with concrete floors and drains. In cold climates some form of water heating 
may be needed.
Hand washing can play a large part in breaking the faecal-oral contamination 
chain. All those leaving latrines or entering kitchens or feeding centres 
should wash their hands. Oil drums fitted with taps and mounted on stands 
and with a piece of soap on a rope are best as this discourage the waste ofc
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water. The hygiene guard can control the tap. Small gravel soakaways 
should be provided for the waste water.
Soap is a vital part of personal hygiene. Soap helps to break down dirt and 
remove it from the skin. Even if the general distribution includes soap is 
should still be provided at hand-washing points. The soap at hand-washing 
points may be a different colour to discourage theft where this is a problem. 
When there is no soap in the general distribution it is common to find people 
exchanging food or other relief goods to obtain it.
LAUNDRY AND DELOUSING
People need to wash their bodies as well as their clothes. If there are no 
laundry slabs every flat clean surface in the camp will be pressed into service. 
This may lead to congestion at water points and at other facilities. Clean 
clothes are important to morale. Performing such routine acts as clothes 
washing may aid recovery after an emergency.
Areas for drying clothes must be provided near laundry areas. Laundry lines 
are the cheapest way of doing this. It may help to fence off the whole of the 
laundry area to prevent the theft of drying clothes. Barbed wire should not 
be used as the fence itself will also be used for drying.
People arriving at a camp may need 
delousing and their clothes disinfecting.
This is essential if there is a threat of 
typhus or other louse borne disease. The 
normal pattern is for new arrivals to wash 
before being issued with new clothes. The 
old clothes should be disinfected and 
returned. The old clothes that people 
arrive in may be their only possessions and 
losing them may be painful.
Personal possessions may be fumigated, 
washed or steamed. Washing or steaming 
are safer than fumigation. Body lice live 
in clothing and only go onto the body to feed. Stray lice on the body may be 
removed by shaving body hair and washing.
Chemical Louse Control. 
Head and Pubic Lice.
1% permethrin creme rinse.
Clothes.
Washing for 20 minutes in 
water at 55°C or steaming 
for 5 minutes.
1% Malathion or lindane. 
Pyrethrins with piperonal 
baptized or carbaryl can 
also be used. 2% temephos 
dusting powder can be used 
with resistant strains.
Fumigation with 2ppm of 
ethyl formate for 1 hour.
c
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Shaving heads for the control of head lice can have a dehumanising effect and 
should not be used. Head lice and pubic lice are not serious disease vectors 
and are easily controlled with chemicals. Widespread outbreaks of lousiness 





Visit the site and hold discussions with community leaders. These initial 
discussions may help to identify how the community perceives sanitation 
problems. Any sanitation program will rely heavily on the co-operation of the 
community.
Locate implementing partners. It is often very difficult to locate an 
implementing partner for a sanitation project. Sanitation is not photogenic, 
unlike curative health or water supply. Members of the community may have 
the skills to manage the program.
Clean site. If a site is already in use the priority should be to clean it and 
remove any faecal contamination on site. If flies are already a nuisance it 
may be necessary to spray the site. Road construction equipment may be 
needed to clean large areas. The community may be able to help.
Construct defecation furrows. These are probably the best option for 
immediate emergency latrines. This should only be done with the agreement 
of the community.
Establish Sanitation Committee if it is not already in place. The first 
concrete actions in the program may increase willingness to participate.
Begin pit latrine construction. It will take a long time to build latrines for 
the whole population and construction should start as soon as possible to 
minimise the need for emergency latrines.
Begin latrine slab construction. This is often the most difficult logistic 
component of a sanitation program and the latrine slabs may take several 
weeks to cure before they are ready.
Install drainage. The urgency with which this needs to be done depends on 
the time of year. If it is not done quickly it may not be possible to build 
drains without destroying shelters. The soil conservation section of the 
Ministry of Agriculture can give advice on this.
Institute proper disposal of waste water. Install soakaways around drainage 




Set up a waste collection system. Ordering plastic rubbish sacks will be one 
of the first activities here. Local contractors may abe available to deal with
general rubbish. Contractors may not be reliable enough to be trusted with 
hospital wastes.
Make a long term plan with the sanitation committee. This should include
details of how the community will assume complete responsibility for 
sanitation.
If flies or mosquitoes are a nuisance get specialist advice. A campaign 
with both chemical and environmental sanitation components may give the 
best results. The ministry of health and the ministry of agriculture can often 
give useful advice.
Diarrhoeal disease emergencies. If there is a risk of epidemics of diarrhoeal
disease the pre-positioning of an Oxfam sanitation kit for the isolation hospital 
could be a good move.
Other measures. The other measures to be taken will depend on the needs 
of the community and how they perceive their situation. Community 
assistance should be a prerequisite for solving any problem identified by the 
community for which they propose a solution.
This area might include laundry slabs, showers and washing areas. Some




There is a wide literature on sanitation. Most of this concentrates on 
development projects. Latrines are the main emphasis of most publications. 
As with water supplies the texts concentrate on the construction details. 
There is very little written on their successful long term operation and 
maintenance. The following are among some of the most useful publications. 
This following references are suitable for the general reader more than for the 
specialist.
Cairncross, S & Feachem R. Small Excreta Disposal Systems. Ross 
Bulletin 8. Ross Institute, London, 1988. 54pp, ill. This good short 
guide to sanitation options has recently been revised. A comprehensive 
and authoritative review of sanitation options but not specifically aimed 
at emergencies. It is highly recommended. It may encourage you to 
consider other approaches to your project.
Cairncross, S. and Feachem R.G. Environmental Health Engineering in 
the tropics. Wiley, Chichester: 1983. 283pp. ill. app. glos. This 
clearly written text is the best primer on the health impact of water 
supply, sanitation and waste disposal from an engineering viewpoint. 
Of particular interest is the comprehensive approach which the authors 
adopt towards their subject.
Benenson, A.S. (Ed). Control of Communicable Diseases in Man.
Fifteenth edition. American Public Health Association, Washington: 
1990. 532 pp. The definitive guide to communicable diseases.
Although somewhat technical it included clear advice on the sanitation 
measures to be taken for the control of different diseases.
Morgan, P. Rural Water Supplies and Sanitation. Macmillan, London: 
1990. 358pp. ill. A practical well illustrated text dealing mainly with 
water supply. The book has a very useful section on sanitation 
concentrating on the ventilated improved pit latrine developed by the 
Blair Laboratory in Zimbabwe.
Busvine, J.R. Insects and Hygiene. Chapman and Hall, London: 1980. 
568pp. ill. app. A thorough and scholarly review of the biology and 
control of insect pests of medical and domestic importance. More 
suitable for a reader from a life sciences background.
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Youdeowei, A and Service M.W. Pest and Vector Management in the 
Tropics. Longman, London. 400pp, ill. A thorough and readable 
review of both insect pests of agriculture and insect vectors of disease. 
Both insecticidal and environments sanitation measures are described. 
Does not specifically deal with emergencies but still contains some very 
useful material.
Busvine, J.R. Arthropod Vectors of Disease. The Institute of Biology’s 
Studies in Biology N° 55. Edward Arnold, London. 68pp. ill. A Brief 
introduction to the insect pests of main medical importance. Describes 
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The purposes of this paper are:
1. to describe the conceptual framework;
2. to identify principles of organization;
3. to describe general aspects of a logistics system; and
4. to provide some operational hints and suggestions.
INTRODUCTION
Logistics is not a highly-complicated activity, yet few organizations 
properly implement logistics operations. There are too few experienced or 
trained logisticians working in the field of emergency operations and, as 
a result, a key component of emergency operations often becomes fraught 
with problems and costly delays.
Logistics for emergency relief operations is different from most other 
types of logistics systems. The need for speedy delivery of supplies, 
coupled with non-standard customs procedures, serves to complicate the 
system and create logjams from the initial stages of an operation. Unless 
an organization is properly prepared to address the problems at the out­
set, they can quickly multiply and further delay deliveries. This paper 
will give a general overview of emergency logistics, identify common 
problems, and offer some suggestions on how to overcome the most common 
obstacles.
A. Definition
A good working definition of emergency logistics is:
"The practical art of establishing lines of supply, 
providing the commodities, and the transport to move them."
The term "lines of supply" is a key concept; logistics should be 
thought of as a linear system —  a flow of supplies from point to point. 
Another way to view logistics is as a system of supply, where items (or 
commodities) flow through the system in one direction and the system of 
controls sends documents flowing back in the other direction. For 
example, supplies such as food move down the system while requisitions and 
reports flow back in the other direction.
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B. The Importance of Logistics
Logistics is the lifeline of a relief operation. People depend upon 
food and other supplies in the system.
Logistics is also usually the most expensive part of an operation.
For example, a truck that can move across unpaved roads costs approxi­
mately $50,000 U.S. dollars; its trailer may cost $10,000 - 15,000 or 
more. Therefore, a 100-truck fleet with spares costs approximately $10 
million (not including fuel, maintenance or insurance).
Because it is so expensive, logistics is the most problematic aspect 
of a relief operation. In part, this is because it is the activity most 
subject to corruption, especially when the goods involved are in short 
supply in the host community. Whenever there are competing demands for 
food, fuel and other relief supplies, then thefts, pilferage and diver­
sions can be expected.
The costs of logistics operations are often increased because the 
agencies are inexperienced in handling commodities or are not familiar 
with the limitations of transport or the complexities of the various 
stages of a logistics system. In logistics, time equals money —  when a 
procured commodity sits in a warehouse or on a ship, it costs the agency 
even while it is not in motion. During the Ethiopian famine of 1985, the 
final cost of food doubled due to the long delays encountered in the ports 
and in trying to transport the food inland.
As vital as logistics activities are in an emergency relief operation, 
there are few trained emergency logisticians; most of the people handling 
logistics have gained their knowledge by trial-and-error, and many consis­
tently make the same mistakes. At the international level, there is no 
central coordinating body to try to relieve competition in procurement or 
transport and, at the country level, there is rarely a group set up to 
schedule arrivals of ships or planes to relieve port congestion. Thus, it 
is no wonder that logistics delays and costs mount so quickly.
C. The Scope of Logistics
Logistics covers the movement of many different items but, in emer­
gency logistics, movement of food is its primary and most important 
function. The movement of medical supplies, especially vaccines, is also 
important but is usually much smaller in scale and requires specialized 
equipment and arrangements. Additional activities include movement of 
non-food items such as tents, household supplies, fuel and equipment; and 
movement of people from one site to another.
D. The Element of Time
An important objective of a logistics operation is to reduce transit 
time, especially in the earliest stages of an emergency. Often, decisions 
are made more on the basis of time than on cost. Time becomes the cri­
terion against which all initial decisions are measured. In this sense, 
the time element is unique to emergency relief logistics and makes it 
distinct from other forms of logistics operations.
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CONCEPTUALIZING LOGISTICS
A. Components of a Logistics System
Logistics is a set of interrelated, components. The primary components 
are the physical elements of the system or the hardware: the secondary 
components are the various controls, sometimes called the software.
Primary components include warehouses and other storage facilities; 
transport such as trucks, planes, ships and/or other carriers; and special 
facilities such as fuel depots, garages, milling facilities, cold storage 
for perishables, and cold storage facilities for medicines.
Secondary components include:
!• a control system consisting of:
a. procurement;
b. a monitoring system (waybills, call forwards, 
etc., which are used to track the operation);
requisitions, 
and
c. the persons who coordinate the shipments and 
and audits of the supplies in the system.
carry out checks
2• a distribution system which controls distribution of the commo­
dities in the refugee camps or settlements.
B. Model of a Typical Logistics System
The following is a conceptual model of a typical logistics system. 
The objective is to move supplies from their source (the supplier) to 




The movement of supplies is carried out through a series of movements 
(transport) and intermediate stops at warehouses, represented diagrammati- 
cally in the drawing below:
W ---------> T --------- > W
(Warehouse) (Transport) (Warehouse)
Supplies are shipped from the supplier by truck or rail to a warehouse 
on the dock at the port of shipment, then transported by ship (or in some 




-> W ---------> T --------- > W
(Dock) (Port of Entry)
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At the port of entry, the commodities are cleared and then transported 
again to another (regional) warehouse and from there to a warehouse in the 
refugee camp:
S-- > T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W
(Port of (Regional (Regional (Camp)
Entry) Warehouse) Warehouse)
From the warehouse in the refugee camp, the commodities enter the 
distribution system and move directly to the refugees:
S-- > T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W--->DS--->R
(Regional (Camp) (Refugees) 
Warehouse)
Conceptually, the overall system can be divided into three stages.
The first stage is from supplier to port of entry; the second stage is 
from the port (after clearance) to the refugee camp or settlement (in most 
cases, through an intermediate warehouse in the vicinity or region of the 
refugee camps); the third stage is from the camp warehouse through the 
distribution system to the refugees.
S-- > T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> DS---> R
[------First Stage------][-----Second Stage-----] [-Third Stage-]
C. Control Responsibilities
Responsibility for controlling logistics in the first stage lies with 
the purchasing agent (in UNHCR, the procurement section). Control begins 
with the specifications of the order. The supplier is responsible for 
meeting the specifications, shipping the commodity, and delivering it in 
good shape to the port of entry. (Note: insurance does not extend beyond 
the port of entry. For this reason, in most cases the supplier will not 
accept responsibility beyond the acceptance of the commodity in the port 
of entry.)
Once the shipment has been cleared, a relief agency is usually the 
consignee and takes responsibility for onward shipment to the refugee 
camp; thus, the agency is responsible for control in the second stage.
Most of the effort (and problems) occurs during the second stage, primar­
ily because agencies are not adequately prepared for this task. Ideally, 
responsibility for control is vested in a person known as the "traffic 
director . The traffic director controls delivery schedules, assignment 
of supplies, and decisions regarding when to ship from the port of entry 
to intermediate warehouses and/or the refugee camps. The traffic director 
is usually the chief logistician and, in some situations, may be the local 
procurement officer.
In the third stage —  distribution in the refugee camp —  the camp 
administrator (or, in the case of scattered sites, the agency in charge of 
distribution) is responsible for control.
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Conceptually, the control system looks like this:
Procurement & Supplier Consignee (Traffic Dir.) Camp Admin.
S--- > T----> W----> T----> W----> T----> W----> T----> W----> D----> R
[-------First Stage--------- ][------ Second Stage--------] [— Third Stage— ]
D. Local Procurement
So far, we have described a full-scale international logistics sys­
tem. There is, however, a way to significantly reduce and simplify 
logistics, by local procurement. With local procurement, it is possible 
to eliminate all of the first stage and most of the second as shown in the 
diagram below:
S--- > T--- > W--- > DS--- > R
(Local
Supplier)
It is usually possible to contract with local suppliers to deliver 
needed commodities directly to the refugee camps.
E. Logistics Coordination
The most important person in a logistics operation is the traffic 
director, whose responsibilities include:
1. controlling procurement and distribution;
2. controlling transport, i.e., controlling allocation of trucks or 
other vehicles and where they go;
3. monitoring the warehouses;
4. directing allocations of supplies to the intermediate warehouses 
and from there on to the camps; and
5. planning the overall distribution system in cooperation with the 
camp administrators.
The traffic director must be based in the field, have adequate trans­
port to be able to move up and down the system from the refugee camp to 
the port of entry, and be able to control the fuel allocation for the 
vehicles in the logistics system. Ideally, the traffic director is an 
experienced logistician from an agency that has extensive experience in 
moving large quantities of supplies and is thoroughly familiar with 
priorities in a relief operation. In summary, the traffic director should 
be the focal point for all coordination in a logistics system.
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F. Decision-making
The need to make early logistics decisions in an emergency cannot be 
overemphasized. Early decisions save money and lives. This is especially 
true regarding food and medical supplies. The longer basic decisions are 
delayed, the greater the cost will be. For instance, if it takes two 
months from the time food is ordered to the time it arrives in a refugee 
camp, delaying a decision to procure and ship the food by even a week 
means that a portion of the food will probably have to be expedited by 
increasing the cost perhaps ten—fold. If the decision is delayed 
even longer, it simply may not be possible to meet all the needs; as a 
result, lives may be put in jeopardy unless alternate sources of food can 
be found.
G. System Planning
At the very outset of an emergency, planners should conceptualize and 
plan the entire logistics system. It is important to define the key roles 
and responsibilities of all personnel at each stage and to set up the 
records and controls required to monitor the flow of supplies through the 
system. Too often, organizations attempt to set up the system in a piece­
meal fashion, resulting in confusion, delays and higher costs.
LOGISTICS CONTROLS
Control over commodities in the logistics system is carried out with 
the use of various types of documents. As supplies go down the system 
from supplier to destination, the documents include I
waybills or bills of lading. These shipping documents are used to 
control the shipment during transport.
stock control cards and warehouse records. These documents control 
the supplies while they are in a warehouse.
ration cards. These provide the primary commodity control within the 
distribution system.
This system can be diagrammed as follows:
Waybills Waybills Ration cards
S --------> t -------- > W -------- > T -------- > W -------- > D S -------- > R
Stock Cards & Stock Cards &
Warehouse Records Warehouse Records
The paperwork which controls the flow or rate of movement of supplies 
while they are in the system consists of:
g^ l-l forwards. These documents are issued to summon supplies already 
in the system.
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requisitions» These issue a;call for supplies that need to be ordered 
or sent from a buffer stock further up the system.
purchase orders or contracts. These are issued to suppliers by pro­
curement officers to initiate the purchase of supplies not already in 
the system.
A. The Primary Documents
The two documents that control Stage I and II logistics are the way­
bill and the stock card.
Waybills are used to record the cargos being shipped and to certify 
that they have been received by the transporter in good shape and are 
being delivered in the same shape and quantity as received.
Normally a waybill will have an original plus three or four copies. 
When a transporter delivers the supplies to a warehouse, the waybill is 
signed and the transporter uses a copy as his invoice for payment. Other 
copies are maintained by the shipper at the point of origin and the ware­
houseman at the destination. Additional copies are used to notify the 
traffic director that the goods have arrived at the specified location.
Stock cards are the primary means of controlling supplies in the ware­
house. They provide not only a storage record but also a record of the 
in-and-out balance of the commodities within the warehouse. One card is 
generally kept for each type of item in the warehouse.
B. Accountabi1ity
It is important that the chain of accountability in a logistics system 
be clearly understood by all parties. In the warehouse, the accountable 
person is the storekeeper. During transport, accountability lies with the 
driver or person conveying the commodity.
Responsibility during shipment is transferred from storekeeper to 
driver by means of a waybill and from driver to next storekeeper at the 
point of off-loading with a receipted waybill.
Checkers should be employed at each transfer point to check the goods 
loaded or off-loaded and certify that all are accounted for. Damages or 
losses should be recorded on the receipted waybill, indicating overage, 
shortage or damage. Again, the driver is responsible for shortages or 
damages in transit.
C. Distribution Systems and Controls
In an emergency, refugees will usually congregate at a relief center 
or in refugee camps. It is important to establish a distribution system 
that ensures the timely and equitable distribution of food and other 
critical supplies.
There are generally two ways to distribute food in an emergency: by
individual or by group.
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Ah  individual distribution system is generally utilized when people 
arriving in a camp come as individuals or as single families rather than 
as a larger social group such as a clan or village. Group distribution is 
used when the basic social structure of a community is intact and village 
or community leaders can be easily identified (and when they still have 
authority among the refugees).
Individual distributions are dependent on a registration system and 
use of registration or ration cards to identify people and record when 
they have received their food allotment.
Group distribution also requires a registration system but individual 
ration cards are not required so long as the community leaders keep lists 
of those who should receive food based on family units and age distribu­
tion.
As a general rule, group distribution is preferable because it is 
quicker and easier to administer, and because it offers refugees a role in 
food decisions and helps to re-establish traditional community structures.
However, in some cases group distribution should be avoided, at least 
in the initial stages of an emergency. These situations include:
severe food shortages. If the people entering the camp are 
severely malnourished, and if food supplies are irregular, group 
distribution programs may inadvertently lead to food discrimina­
tion, resulting in higher mortality rates among the vulnerable 
groups.
when indentured or "captive" servants/workers are among the popu­
lation. If food shortages exist, the heads of the groups may not 
allocate sufficient food to the workers despite their needs, and 
mortality could be high.
--- when armed insurgents are suspected of using food to control a
refugee population. In 1979, Khmer Rouge cadres hiding among the 
refugees in Thailand tried to maintain control over the people by 
gaining control over food distribution. While an individual dis­
tribution system did not completely eliminate their attempts to 
enforce discipline, it did significantly erode their authority.
D. Problems of Control in Distribution
One of the major problems encountered in distribution control is 
multiple registration. A registration system with ration cards works well 
only if people are assigned to a specific spot or shelter within the camp 
or settlement and periodic cross-checks are made to match the numbers 
against the locations.
E * Role of Procurement in Logistics Control
The role of procurement in logistics control is often not clearly 
understood, even by procurement officers. Control in the system begins 
with the setting of technical specifications for the items being pur­
chased. These specifications establish the quality of the commodity.
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Other decisions made at the time of procurement also affect quality 
and the likely condition of the supplies when they arrive at their destin­
ation. For example, specifications regarding packaging of foods can 
determine how well they travel, the percentage of loss that can be 
expected en route, and how long the commodity can be maintained in a 
destination warehouse. What may appear to be a minor decision about the 
type of bag to use for food —  cloth or polypropylene —  can have a major 
effect on shelf-life and transportation requirements.
In most international relief organizations, procurement offices are 
located in the headquarters of the organization and procurement officers 
are often far removed and sometimes unacquainted with conditions in the 
field. Unless the field staff provides thorough and clear specifications, 
complications are likely to develop. Therefore, it is extremely important 
that the procurement process begin with requests from the field. Ideally, 
procurement officers or personnel thoroughly briefed in procurement proce­
dures should be assigned to the logistics team in the field and given 
responsibility for preparing the procurement specifications; then the 
primary role of a procurement officer at headquarters should be to facili­
tate and support requests from the field. While this is undoubtedly 
difficult, given donor pressures and the reality of donor constraints, it 
is important that organizations strive to focus their procurement activi­
ties at the field level, not at headquarters.
STORAGE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
A. Warehousing
Selection of warehousing is important since relief supplies are likely 
to spend a good deal of time in these facilities.
1. Size. The warehouse must be large enough to store the types and 
quantities of supplies that are being stockpiled. If a variety 
of goods are being stored in one place, then the warehouse plan 
should be based on the most bulky commodity.
Food grains usually require more space than other relief commo­
dities. As a rule of thumb, one ton of grain normally occupies a 
floor space of one square meter and a volumetric space of one 
cubic meter. Therefore, calculating the amount of storage space 
needed is fairly easy; if 500 tons of grain must be stored, for 
example, a warehouse of approximately 500 cubic meters of storage 
space is required. (For more details on storage requirements, 
see UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, p. 42.)
2* Permanent buildings. When storing grain, it is usually best to 
select permanent buildings with hard-surfaced (preferably con­
crete) floors. Almost any type of building can be used for 
storage, but those with minimal windows and large access doors 
are generally best since the likelihood of pilferage and theft is 
reduced with fewer windows. Storage of grains on the second 
floor should be avoided as the structure is unlikely to have been 
designed to withstand the heavy weight.
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In remote locations, or in refugee camps or settlementsj it may 
be necessary to construct temporary warehouses. In some 
situations, adequate supplies of local materials may be 
available. Wherever time and weather conditions permit, 
small-scale warehouses can be built using local resources and 
employing refugee and/or local labor.
Prefab structures. Use of prefabricated flexible, plastic ware­
houses is increasing in emergencies, and many models are now 
available. A primary criterion for selection should be its 
demonstrated wind resistance and climatic suitability. Before 
procuring a prefabricated warehouse, the method of anchoring the 
warehouse to the ground should be ascertained. In 1985, one- 
third of the warehouses procured for emergency relief operations 
in eastern Sudan were destroyed within a two-week period because 
they were insufficiently anchored to the ground and were unable 
to withstand high winds.
4* Selection criteria. Other than space, the main overall consider­
ation for warehouses is the amount of protection provided for the 
items stored. Within the storage enclosure, commodities must be 
protected from:
--  the climatic environment;
--  theft;
--- rodents and other pests.
Organization. Warehouses must be well—organized. Different 
commodities must be clearly identifiable and all supplies must be 
within easy reach. Warehouses should be organized on a first-in, 
first-out (FIFO) basis so that food and medicines can be kept as 
fresh as possible.
6. Controls. Access to warehouses must be controlled. Ideally,
controls begin outside the building with a fence, good lighting 
and a controlled gate. Within the warehouse, controls include 
limited access to the building, interior lighting and limited 
access to the supplies by persons entering the building. At a 
minimum, workers who are authorized to enter should have some 
means of identification.
From the very outset, it is important that stock controls, stock 
cards and other key paperwork be available and that warehouse 
operators be thoroughly familiar with proper use of the control 
documents.
B. Storage Equipment
The most common means of providing additional protection to goods in 
storage is use of plastic sheeting and canvas tarpaulins. Both have only 
a moderate ability to provide protection against moisture and no ability 
to protect against insects or rodents.
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Recently, two new items have been developed to help store food grains 
in temperate or dry climates: bulk-grain silos and storage cubes. These 
containers are ideal for relief operations; they are light and easy to 
transport and move on site. The containers are gas-tight and are.made of 
a FVC sheet 0.83mm in thickness with long durability under conditions of 
solar ultraviolet (UV) irradiation. The primary advantage of this system 
over conventional plastic silos or other grain storage systems is that the 
storage containers are hermetically-sealed. The effect of hermetic 
storage is that, while the container is sealed, the oxygen concentration 
drops to between 6%-8% and carbon dioxide concentrations rise to approxi­
mately 11%. Thus, insects cannot survive in the bag, and costly and 
potentially hazardous fumigation is unnecessary.
As with most synthetic materials, rodents can gnaw through PVC 
liners. However, the design of the containers and the way the material 
lies over the grain provide slippery surfaces that make it extremely 
difficult for rodents to make an incision with their teeth.
Two basic designs are available: a circular silo for bulk storage of 
unbagged grains, and a cubical container for storage of bagged grains.
The silos are made in sizes from 50 to 1,000 metric tons, while the 
storage cubes are normally produced in sizes corresponding to truckbed 
cargo loads (10 to 50 tons).
The designs enable the containers to be used in various ways through­
out the logistics system. Some common uses of the silos include:
auxiliary dockside storage. Large 500-1,000 ton silos can be 
used to provide temporary bulk storage at ports when inland 
transport cannot clear the food from the wharves promptly. With 
these units, costly port congestion can be relieved and spoilage 
of food on the wharves can be prevented.
overflow storage at regional logistics bases. Silos can be used 
to provide additional storage for unbagged grains at regional 
food storage depots or distribution centers. In order to relieve 
port congestion and bagging delays, bulk grains can be moved 
inland on lorries, transferred to storage silos, and then bagged 
at a regional depot or distribution center.
--  storage of locally-procured grains. In camps or settlements
where local procurement of supplies is undertaken or where the 
refugees produce a portion of their food needs, the silos can be 
use to store and protect the grain. (They were originally 
designed to improve village grain storage and to reduce losses.) 
Since the silos are hermetically-sealed, losses from moisture, 
insects and rodents are minimized.
Storage cubes may be used for:
temporary dockside storage of bagged grains. Cubes can provide 
temporary safe, weatherproof storage space for bagged grains at 
overcrowded wharves until the food can be transported inland.
They can be obtained in sizes corresponding to the loads carried 
by lorries, to facilitate logistical scheduling and loading.
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temporary storage at forward warehouses or in refugee camps. The 
cubes can provide additional safe storage for bagged grains until 
they can be distributed or placed in conventional warehouses.
point storage for cross-line or cross-border logistics. Cubes 
can be used for staging food into remote areas where conventional 
storage facilities are not available. Food can be off-loaded 
directly into the cubes which remain sealed until it is needed.
C. Grain-Milling
In most cases, grains should be transported in an unmilled state, as 
milling greatly decreases its shelf-life (by as much as 90% for some 
grains). Thus, it is important to decide at what point in the system 
grains will be milled. The two most common places are the port of entry 
and the refugee camps. As a general rule, it is best to mill grains in 
the camps or settlements, or to provide the equipment needed for the 
refugees to mill grains themselves. This reduces losses, sp>eeds delivery 
and, for some grains, ensures that a greater portion of the nutrients is 
available for use.
It is important that some milling facilities be provided; if they are 
not, refugees will almost certainly trade a portion of their food to local 
entrepreneurs in order to obtain that service. This can result in sub­
stantial food losses. Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe once surrendered 
25% of their grains to local millers. Such a loss can drastically affect 
nutritional status in an emergency situation.
D. Cold Storage and Cold Chain Facilities
If vaccines are required for an immunization program, it is necessary 
to establish a cold chain". Cold chain logistics is a special branch of 
emergency logistics and one that is almost always problematic. Some 
vaccines must be maintained within a specific temperature range from the 
time they are produced until the time they are injected into a patient. 
Anytime the temperature goes above or below that range, the vaccines can 
be damaged and lose their effectiveness. In order to establish a cold 
chain, certain types of equipment and facilities are required. These 
include:
cold storage rooms at national or regional warehouses;
--  sealed cold boxes for transporting the vaccines; and
self~P°wered refrigerators or vaccine bins to store vaccines in 
the camps.
The most common "break" in a cold chain occurs when vaccines are ship- 
Ped or stored in containers used also for food and beverages for relief 
workers. As p>eople op>en and close the containers to retrieve refresh­
ments , temperatures inside drop below the critical levels and the vaccines 
are damaged. It is important that all facilities used to store vaccines 
be totally dedicated to that purpose. The World Health Organization (WHO)
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provides current lists of suppliers of cold chain equipment and approved 
cold boxes for use in emergencies. These can be obtained from:
World Health Organization 
20 Avenue Appia 
1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
E. Forward Logistics Bases
In an emergency operation, it is often necessary to set up new logis­
tics bases in order to simplify supply operations in the forward areas. 
These bases can usually be established quickly, especially if existing 
buildings are available for use as warehouses. If suitable buildings can­
not be found, storage cubes may be used until prefab warehouses are 
erected.
The minimal requirements for a forward base are:
1. adequate warehouses;
2. storage cubes or tarpaulins to protect stockpiles;
3. fuel dep>ot;
4. vehicle workshop;
5. radio, telephone or telex communications.
The site for the base is chosen according to the type(s) of transport 
delivering and forwarding supplies. Usually a railhead or major road 
junction is a good location. The most important factor, however, is the 
amount of time required to deliver goods to the principal places of need 
in the forward area. In other words, the decision should be made not 
according to distance alone (the site physically closest to the areas to 
be served) but rather according to the actual amount of time it takes to 
travel that distance (the site with the best access to those areas).
A checklist of equipment and facilities for a forward logistics base 
is found in the Appendix to this paper.
TRANSPORT
As mentioned earlier, transport is the most expensive part of a relief 
operation. Thus, it is important to select the most appropriate form of 
transport for specific commodities.
A. Cargo Factors
The first consideration about a cargo is its weight. Weight is the 
primary limiting factor in all forms of transport. The heavier a 
commodity, the more expensive it is to transport and the more rugged (and 
generally, slower) the form of transport.
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The second consideration is volume. Items that are low in weight but 
large in volume should usually receive a lower priority for transport.
For example, plastic jerrycans are often in great demand in a relief oper­
ation. They are very lightweight —  a thousand weigh only one ton —  yet 
the volume of a jerrycan is such that about thirty take up one cubic meter 
of space. Therefore, in a transport plane the size of a C-130, it is only 
possible to bring approximately 1,000 jerrycans cans per flight. Since 
the jerrycans only cost about $5.00 each, shipping them by air (which 
could cost up to $100,000 for an international flight) does not make much 
sense.
Most logistics planners use a rule of thumb known as "cubing-out" to 
determine the most appropriate type of transport, i.e., striking the right 
balance between the volume and the weight of an item. Nowhere is this 
more important than in choosing cargoes to transport by air.
B. Transport Efficiencies
Ships/barges are the most cost-efficient means of transport but are 
usually the slowest. Aircraft are the least cost-efficient.
Shipping by rail over long distances is usually more cost-efficient 
than using lorries) the longer the distance, the more efficient.
While railways are more cost-efficient than lorries, and can sometimes 
reach areas in the rainy season that lorries cannot, railways are also 
more problematic in most Third World countries. In an emergency when 
timeliness is crucial, it may be more advantageous to ship by lorry than 
by rail. If one truck breaks down, there are still others that are likely 
to get through) but if one locomotive breaks down, 20 railway carriages 
can be stopped indefinitely.
In very remote (especially mountainous) areas, pack animals may often 
be more practical than trucks and other forms of transport.
C. Criteria for Selecting Vehicles
Important considerations when selecting vehicles include:
--  the distance to be traveled;
--- the terrain)
--- road conditions)
--  whether or not streams must be forded;
--  load-carrying capacity of bridges en route;
--- fuel efficiency; and
compatibility of the vehicle with in—country maintenance and 
parts availability.
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D. Determining Fleet Size
In determining the number of vehicles that must be employed for a 
particular mission, it is important to consider:
--- time en route, and turn-around times;
--  load-carrying capacity of the vehicles being used; and
--  total tonnage needed to serve the target population.
E. Logistics staff
Successful implementation depends on a good logistics staff. Most 
logistics operations are understaffed. A good system requires many people 
including a traffic director, procurement coordinator, transport coordin­
ator, fuel coordinator, forward logistics officer, inventory control offi­
cers, accountants, warehouse staff, procurement officer, and maintenance 
officers. If not enough qualified people are used, control will be lost 
(and so will some of the commodities).
F. Equipment
Equipment that is critical for a relief logistics operation includes 
telecommunications, control forms (these should be ready before an opera­
tion starts), forklifts (special forklifts are necessary to unload 
planes), pallets to store and stack supplies, and spare parts for 
vehicles.
G. Air Transport
With the advent of large military cargo aircraft and large wide-body 
"jumbo jets", it has become commonplace for relief organizations to ship 
cargoes by air in the early stages of an emergency. For the most part, 
this does not make much sense since many of these shipments consist of 
items available locally or for which local substitutes could be found.
With basic health programs, such as UNICEF’s Expanded Program of Immuniza­
tion (EPI), even the necessity of sending vaccines is greatly diminished 
since adequate stockpiles have been developed in most countries.
Air transport is both costly and, ultimately, of little sustainable 
impact. Even the largest jet transports, such as the Boeing 747 and Lock­
heed C-5 Galaxy, have negligible cargo-carrying capacity when compared to 
other forms of transport. The C-130 Hercules and the Antonov An-28, the 
most pxjpular transports used in relief operations, can only carry a 
maximum of about twenty tons of food; that is equivalent to the capacity 
of one medium-sized lorry without a trailer. Over a typical flight of 
1000 kilometers, the C-130 will burn approximately ten tons of fuel. At 
an average cost of $1,000 per ton, it will cost about $10,000 in fuel 
alone to deliver the supplies. Compare this to a shipping cost of $50 p>er 
ton by sea, or $25 p>er ton by lorry, and it is clear that air shipments 
make little sense unless the cargo is truly needed for immediate life­
saving .
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Despite the costs, there are often tremendous pressures on relief 
agencies to fly in supplies for an emergency. Donor governments often 
make military transport available to humanitarian organizations at little 
or no cost. In these circumstances, the following principles may be 
followed:
1* Use of Aircraft. In first-stage logistics:
use the largest plane available. Ideal civilian aircraft 
are the Boeing 747, DC-10, L-1011, DC-8F or Boeing 707; 
military aircraft include the C-5 and C-141 transports.
Avoid the smaller tactical transports like the C-130 or 
C-160 Transall for long international flights.
--  land as close as possible to the theater of operations.
--  ship only items of verified high priority (such as measles
vaccines, etc.) or equipment that will facilitate operations 
(radios, light vehicles, prefabricated warehouses, etc.).
if foods must be shipped, choose those that will provide the 
highest amount of calories and energy per weight. Avoid 
sending basic grains.
in second-stage logistics, use aircraft only when all other means 
have failed. If planes must be used, the following principles 
may apply:
generally, the shorter the distance, the more practical the 
airlift (the aircraft will need to carry less fuel and 
therefore can carry a greater cargo load).
4“‘—  avoid the use of helicopters. They are very costly to
operate and have a very low carrying-capacity. Helicopters 
should only be used to stage supplies over very short areas 
and into remote or isolated sites.
--  in second-stage logistics, the C-130, the French-German
C-160 Transall, and smaller aircraft are more practical 
since the flights are over shorter distances, less fuel is 
required and more cargo can be carried. Planes like the 
C-130 were originally designed as tactical transports and to 
land on relatively short, unimproved strips.
In summary, if someone else is paying for the aircraft, go ahead 
and use them; but remember that it will still be necessary to use 
trucks at both ends of the flight!
2. Ground support for forward air operations. If it becomes
necessary to use small or medium-sized planes to deliver priority 
supplies to remote sites, the following factors must be consi­
dered:
--  fuel. If the flights are over a range of 500 kilometers, it
will probably be necessary to provide fuel at the landing
16
strip in order to permit the transports to carry a full load 
on every trip. The type of fuel required depends on the 
type of plane used. Turbo-prop aircraft use jet fuel (Jet 
A-l is the standard), while piston-driven aircraft use 100 
octane avgas.
Turbine engines burn more fuel per hour than piston 
engines. Although turbine fuel is cheaper than avgas, it is 
necessary to have a larger stockpile of fuel available when 
aircraft with turbine engines are engaged.
fueling systems. In remote areas, fuel is normally stored 
either in barrels or rubberized fuel bladders. A pump and 
hose must be available for fueling the aircraft and must 
meet certain specifications. The normal rotary pumps used 
for pumping diesel or petrol into automobiles cannot be used 
for aircraft since they leave small metal shavings that can 
damage aircraft engines. Aircraft pumps and hoses have in­
line filters. The nozzles have different sizes, depending 
on the type of fuel being dispensed. Under no circumstances 
should a pump that has been used for jet fuel then be used 
for dispensing avgas; even a small residue of jet fuel can 
contaminate avgas and cause a piston engine to miss.
defueling and fuel transfers. An expedient way of fueling 
when using both large transports and smaller utility air­
craft is to either transfer fuel directly from the transport 
to the utility aircraft or defuel the transport into barrels 
or bladders at the intermediate strip. A recent example 
from Sudan illustrates how this works. In order to deliver 
relief supplies to Abeyi, a small town on the edge of the 
conflict zone in southern Sudan, relief supplies were 
ferried from Khartoum to an intermediate strip in Kadugli by 
C-130. They were then transferred to two smaller Twin 
Otters and flown to Abeyi which only had a short 2,000-foot 
strip. To provide fuel for the two smaller airplanes, each 
time the C-130 landed, it de-fueled approximately one and a 
half tons of fuel into portable bladders which were then 
used to fuel the Twin Otters between their trips. Each day 
the C-130, carrying 20 tons of supplies, made one trip while 
the Twin Otters, which carried 2 tons each, made five trips 
per day. The same type of staging and de-fueling can be 
used to fuel remote helicopter operations.
If all the aircraft in the operation use the same type of 
fuel, tankering and de-fueling operations are usually more 
practical than staging fuel in barrels or bladders since the 
containers take up space in the cargo bay that could be used 
for supplies while de-fueling uses the aircraft’s internal 
fuel tanks.
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OPERATIONAL LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Problems to Expect
Certain problems tend to occur frequently in a logistics operation.
The most common are listed below.
1. Problems in Stage 1:
a. procurement delays. These delays are usually a result of 
bidding procedures, confusion about specifications, or lack 
of clarity in field requests.
b. donor pressures to accept substitutes.
c. acquisition of materials that were not requested and are 
unsuitable for the local situation, climate or terrain.
2. Problems in Stage 2:
a . customs delays (paperwork, clearances, etc.).
b. congestion at the port of arrival.
c. inland transport delays.
d. theft and pilferage.
e. losses due to improper storage or inadequate protection of 
the commodities while in storage. (The rations for a 
quarter of a million people were destroyed by one rainstorm 
in Ethiopia in 1985.)
f. materials handling delays (e.g. off-loading of bulk grains, 
bagging operations at the port. etc.).
g. losses from lack of insurance coverage.
3. Problems in Stage 3:
a. inadequate storage facilities at the destination.
b. inadequate means of protecting supplies while in storage.
c. lack of suitable milling equipment.
d. theft and pilferage.
e. problems with registration/disbursement procedures.
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B. Selecting a Logistics Agency
Often, the greatest problem in emergency logistics is selection of a 
suitable agency to operate the system. There are several options that can 
be taken:
--- hiring a private firm;
--- designating an NGO;
--  selecting a specialized U.N. agency (e.g., the ILO).
As a general rule, the agencies best suited for the role are those 
NGOs with experience in managing large-scale food aid programs, especially 
the US PL-480 Title I and II programs. These agencies already have exper­
tise and personnel familiar with food logistics systems, and in many 
countries they already have a logistics system set up. Smaller develop­
ment agencies usually do a marginal job in managing logistics programs.
C. Operational Hints
Always have adequate buffer stocks of supplies on hand to cover 
the times when logistics operations are not able to keep up with 
demand and unanticipated emergencies. Plan for an oversupply of 
20-50% in an emergency.
Buy locally. Local purchase is an important and under-used 
resource. Wherever available, locally-purchased supplies can 
provide significant advantages including:
--- saving time;
--  saving money;
--- bridging gaps until other supplies arrive;
--- providing a buffer against supply irregularities;
--- stimulating the local economy.
Simplify the system. The objective is to reduce the number of 
stops and transfers in the system. This speeds up the operation 
and reduces theft. Even if simplification increases operational 
costs, it will eventually reduce total costs.
Consolidate facilities to avoid unnecessary loading and unloading 
or extra staffing.
Unify the logistics system. For example, where there are several 
organizations simultaneously ordering and distributing food in a 
large operation, unify purchasing and shipping procedures.
Create redundancy in transport. If the operation depends on a 
railway system, for example, the loss of one bridge can halt an
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entire operation. It is necessary to have alternate methods to 
deliver supplies, i.e., a back-up system.
Define the area of operation. The UNHCR Branch Office is likely 
to be in the capital, but the operation is likely to be in a 
remote area. The traffic director should be located in the area 
of operation, i.e., where the key commodities axe located. The 
area of operation generally extends from the port of entry to the 
refugee camps and includes all the communications and transport 
facilities inside that area.
Standardize equipment, especially trucks. This is difficult when 
a donor wants to provide trucks from its own country, but it is 
extremely important to standardize vehicles.
Make small, manageable shipments to the camps. Shipments should 
be of a size that can be controlled and not consumed by the 
refugees too rapidly.
Standardize and minimize supplies. A key concept in logistics 
management is to standardize the types of supplies and equipment 
being used and to keep the number of articles used in a system to 
an absolute minimum. Usually, the first thing a logistics con­
sultant will do is reduce the number of supplies in the system 
until the logistics management controls are in place.
D. Captive Contractors
One of the major problems is keeping the cost of transport at accep­
table levels. Often, local contractors raise prices to unacceptable 
levels when they know that an emergency is in progress and that a relief 
organization has few other options for delivering commodities.
To control transport prices, the relief agency has two options:
1. purchasing a fleet of vehicles and setting up an independent 
transport operation. This is usually a costly choice and 
requires that the agency manage and maintain the trucking fleet.
2. purchasing trucks and then re-selling them to local operators on
a work-equity basis. This approach, known as "captive contrac­
ting", still requires an investment in the vehicles but places 
the burden of maintenance on the purchaser/operator. These
programs are usually quite popular, and the trucks can be amor­
tized over a period of several years. In return for work-equity 
agreements, the purchaser agrees to provide transport services at 
fixed prices for a specified period of time. An added benefit to 
captive contracting is that the vehicles are usually maintained 
better than if they are operated by the relief agency, since the 
prospective owners have a vested interest in ensuring that the 





E. Rules of Thumb for Logistics Operations
1. Use trucks for distances under 500 km., rail for longer 
distances.
2. Don't build roads for food supplies; instead build up buffer 
stocks. The only time to build roads for a transport system is 
when you are moving water.
3. Mill grains in the camps or settlements. This will prolong the 
life of the grain and will eliminate the need for a complex 
unloading, bagging and reloading operation farther up the 
logistics chain.
4. The need to transport supplies by air will be in the early stages 
of an operation, not later on.
5. If a portion of the food supplies must be purchased overseas, buy 
food for the general ration from overseas and supplemental food 
from internal sources (if fresh foods of good quality are 
available).
6. In Africa, it is generally be necessary to import foods for a 
large-scale operation. In the rest of the world, food can 
generally be purchased locally.
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APPENDIX: CHECKLIST OF EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES
O ' FOR FORWARD LOGISTICS BASE
1. Site Preparation 6. Radio Room
Grading and Leveling Permanent
Road Improvements Prefab, Metal
Surfacing Tent
Culverts
Drainage 7. Communications Equipment











File Cabinet Prefab, Plastic
Bookshelves




Prefab, Metal 1000 MT
Prefab, Metal 500 MT 10. Other Work Buildings
Prefab, Metal ?
Prefab, Plastic 1000 MT Permanent
Prefab, Plastic 500 MT Prefab, Metal
Prefab, Plastic ? Plastic




Storage Cubes 100 MT
Storage Cubes 50 MT
Storage Cubes 20 MT 12. Fuel Depot
Storage Cubes 5 MT
Carts/trolleys Storage Tank(s)
Forklift Pumps, Hoses, Fittings
Storage Shelves Defueling Stand
Plastic Sheeting Barrel Storage Area
Other Fire-fighting Equipment
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REFUGEE PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATIONS
By Frederick C. Cuny, INTERTECT
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores refugee participation in emergency- 
relief operations. It reviews current practices 
regarding the involvement of refugees in day-to-day 
projects and activities in a refugee emergency. It 
describes the ways that refugees usually participate, the 
reasons why refugee involvement is not greater than it 
currently is, and some cases where refugee participation 
has achieved a higher than normal degree of involvement. 
The importance of refugee participation is discussed, and 
opportunities for increasing refugee participation in all 
phases of an emergency operation are described.
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART
Full, meaningful participation of refugees in every facet 
of emergency operations is at present a long way from 
being realized. While there is general agreement among 
international relief agencies that refugee participation 
is "good" and should be encouraged, in reality, real 
part ic ipation is lacking and refugee involvement in 
projects is usually little more than people working as 
laborers, attendants, physician’s assistants...a whole 
range of "non-thinking" jobs in refugee camps and 
settlements.
Among relief agencies, refugee participation is an 
"approved" concept. One would be hard-pressed to find 
any international agency advocating openly that refugees 
be denied an opportunity to participate in the programs 
designed to sustain them. Many relief and development 
organizations claim to be advocates; many advertise that 
their programs are designed to promote self-sufficiency 
and self-reliance by transferring the burden of 
decision-making to the refugees themselves.
A review of existing refugee emergency programs will 
show, however, that real participation is lacking. In 
many countries, refugee participation is limited to 
menial jobs and tasks concerned with the operation of the 
refugee camp. In some countries, even the amount of 
labor that is permitted is circumscribed by local 
government policy.
In order to increase the amount of meaningful 
participation, it is important to understand the
111-8 7
1
tunderlying assumptions of "participation", the various 
schools of thought regarding participation, and the 
subtle and not-so-subtle reasons why participation 
often encounters resistance.
A . The Concept
There are two predominant perspectives on refugee 
participation. The first view is that espoused by 
most humanitarian organizations; that is, a democratic 
process of refugees coming together to select theii 
leaders, developing institutions to assist in everyday 
life, and ultimately achieving full participation in 
the decisions relating to their situation. This style 
of participation is uniquely a western liberal concept 
-- a belief that democratic processes are inherently 
good and will benefit the people.
To a large degree, extending to refugees the right to 
participate in decision-making relating to their 
situation can be seen as an offspring of the geneial 
social movements of the ’ 6 0s and t Os w7hich ad\ oca ted 
increased citizen participation in all aspects of 
governmental operations. Prior to that time, thei e 
was little talk or even concern about involving 
refugees in meaningful participation; but as more 
culturally-conscious relief workers moved into the 
international relief system, there were mounting calls 
to increase participatory opportunities.
The second view can be described as guided 
participation. In other words, participation is seen 
as a means to an end on the part of certain groups, 
most often political groups within the refugee 
community and/or the host government. In this view, 
refugees are to be organized for every possible 
activity and assigned leaders who will not only7 train 
the people for specific activities, but will also use 
the organizing activities as a means of providing 
indoctrination, and ultimately control, over the 
community. Refugee organization and participation aie 
seen as an opportunity to further longer-term goals.
It is the latter view of participation that worries 
host governments, and there is little support among 
them for increasing meaningful participation. Ihey 
view organized refugees as a threat: a direct threat
to their control of the community7 and an indirect 
threat because, with foreign political groups in 
control of the refugees, the refugee settlements might 
become a base for guerrillas and a potential point of 
conflict in relations with their neighbors.
B . Prattle vs. Practice
While voluntary agencies and the UN system publicly^ 
advocate refugee participation as a desirable goal ,
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in practice they rarely achieve any degree of 
meaningful refugee participation and in some cases do 
not even encourage it. In a study of U.S. voluntary 
agencies carried out by the Bureau For Private 
Voluntary Assistance of the Agency For International 
Development (AID) entitled "Making Voluntary Agencies 
Development Agencies, Questions For Evaluation", the 
researchers found that while most PVO’s claim to 
promote participation few have actually developed 
meaningful models of participatory management that 
involve the people.
In summary, most agencies overlook or neglect to 
include participation as a goal. Some passively avoid 
the matter", others actively avoid it, and most, simply 
don’t recognize the opportunities that are available 
nor how to exploit them.
In the AID study cited above, the authors found that 
many voluntary agencies were paternalistic, 
condescending and insensitive to the plighu of 
disaster victims. Other observers have referred to 
the relationship between helpers and victims as the 
"we know best" syndrome. To a large extent, this has 
been caused by our perception of disaster victims as 
being helpless, emotionally distraught and geneiallj 
unable to cope with events -- people who must somehow 
be cared for as opposed to given an opportunity help 
themselves. Many aid personnel feel that only they 
have the complete picture of neeas and are therefoie 
in a better position to decide the people’s fate than 
the refugees themselves. This leads to a vicious 
circle whereby people are denied the opportunity to 
participate, lose the sense that they have an\ contiol 
over their lives, and eventually become moie 
lethargic, reinforcing the view that they are 
incapable of taking part in the decision—making 
process.
A failure to involve refugees in meaningful 
participation will ultimately lead to several negative 
consequences. These include:
1. Increasing lethargy on the part of refugees. As 
refugees feel that they have less and less control 
over their lives, they become more lethargic and 
withdraw into themselves. This, in turn, can 
create a variety of serious psychological and 
social problems which, in the end, will make 
assistance programs more difficult to execute. in 
the worst case, this can lead to extreme social 
problems which not only increase not only the costs 
of providing assistance, but also increase 
protection problems.
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2. An increase in costs. If refugees are denied full 
participation, costs increase. Not only will 
certain activities have to be carried out by paid 
workers from outside the camp, which will 
ultimately be more expensive than hiring refugees, 
but many programs or forms of assistance may be 
inappropriate or ill-suited for the situation and 
costly to adjust. With participation, these 
adjustment costs can often be avoided or 
substantially reduced.
3. A decrease in the avenues of communication. 
Communications between the assisting agencies and 
the refugee community are vital if programs are to 
have a beneficial social impact and if protection 
problems are to be avoided. By reducing refugee 
participation to non-meaningful activities, avenues 
of communication are lessened and the likelihood 
that protection problems will increase is greater.
Advocates of increased participation should recognize 
that there is a "down side" to refugee involvement. 
Refugee participation does have its limits, especially 
in regard to decision-making. Participation in, and 
advice about, a particular aspect of a program is 
always important, but to give the ultimate 
decision-making authority to refugees can often be 
counter-productive.
Well-meaning advocates of participation have been 
known to go overboard and ask refugees to make 
technical decisions that they are not qualified to 
make. For example, in 1979 in the preparation of the 
Khao-I-Dang refugee camp in Thailand, the camp 
planners asked the refugees to select the shelter 
systems and design the layout of the shelters. Most 
of the refugees were people from rural areas who had 
no previous experience living in high density 
situations (over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  people destined to live in 
the camp) and never before had they been faced with 
the need to put so many people in such a small area. 
Therefore, the housing style that they chose was to 
build long, multifamily buildings and to place them in 
straight, narrow lines in a grid fashion. Since most 
of the people had never encountered sewage disposal in 
such an environment, there were no plans to integrate 
sanitation within the overall camp layout. As a 
result, the social and environmental conditions 
quickly deteriorated. Had professional planners been 
involved in the camp development, a more creative 
layout would likely have evolved, incorporating more 
open space, near-in sanitation and smaller, less 
hard-to-manage, shelter units.
4
Clearly, some technical questions lie outside the 
purview of competency for refugee decision-making. 
Participation in decision-making, but not necessarily 
the ultimate control over the final decision, is still 
a very desirable objective. The trick for the refugee 
assistance agencies then, is to find a balance between 
participation in decision-making and technical 
requirements.
II• ISSUES
There are several issues involved in the concept of
refugee participation. These include:
A . Accountabi1ity
The principal reason why refugees are not more 
involved in meaningful participatory activities is 
that relief agencies and the international 
organizations do not view themselves as being 
accountable to the refugees but rather to their donors 
and to the host country. Because the agencies do not 
feel themselves accountable, there are no effective 
corrective mechanisms through which refugees can 
attain meaningful participation, nor councils wherein 
they can demand a greater say in their own affaiis.
In short, refugees are left at the mercy and whims of 
the assisting agencies.
B . Determining Appropriate Leaders
A key issue in refugee involvement is defining who 
should provide leadership for the refugee community.
In most cases, relief agencies find that it is easiest 
to work with people with whom they can communicate. 
Therefore, younger bilingual and educated persons 
within the refugee community are usually selected for 
leadership roles. Most often these people are not the 
traditional leaders and may find themselves in 
conflict with the usual community leaders. In this 
case, effective communication and participation is 
often obstructed. An important principle foi lelief 
agencies is that traditional leaders should be 
involved in advisory and decision-making roles while 
younger, educated or "westernized refugees can be 
involved in managing day-to-day operations (but theii 
appointment and authority should alwavs be suboidinate 
to the traditional leadership).
Program planners can create an atmosphere wheiein the 
natural coping mechanisms of a society can operate, 
generating leaders who are respected by the refugee 
community. To do this, the relief agencies should 
develop specialists in informal organization who can
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work within a group of people to identify the coping 
mechanisms, learn how leaders are designated, ^identify 
the traits that are respected, and advise the agencies 
on structuring their programs to allow for the 
emergence of natural leaders. This is especially 
important in those societies where disruption has been 
so great that natural leaders may be absent or 
reluctant to come forward.
C . Stacking
A common problem in refugee involvement is that the 
first people who arrive become the leaders. Relief 
agencies rarely make allowances for the fact that the 
true leaders of the community may not be the first 
arrivals, and they may too quickly institutionalize a 
structure that places non-traditiona 1 leaders in 
leadership roles. This can cause a great deal of 
confusion (and problems) when the more traditional 
leaders arrive and demand to be recognized.
D . Volunteer vs. Salaried Workers
Another question to be addressed is the issue of 
whether people in leadership roles and, more 
particularly, in camp .jobs should be paid or should do 
the work on a voluntary basis. Most relief agencies 
cling to the dogma that work in camps should be 
voluntary, despite the evidence that very few people 
are willing to work for long periods of time without 
pay. Food-for-work programs have been tried but 
without long-term success. People need to be able to 
accumulate local currency in order to purchase 
necessities that are not provided in the relief 
program and to have some cash reserves foi^  
emergencies. As a general rule, participation in 
operational activities (water supply, sanitation, 
garbage collection, food service, etc.) can only be 
guaranteed by paying workers on a long-term basis.
E . Changes in Leadership
One constraint on refugee parti c ipati on is the fact 
that refugee leaders often undergo a high rate of 
turnover. Because the leaders are in contact with 
expatriate workers, they may be eligible sooner than 
others for resettlement. They are also more likely to 
leave the camp early to assimilate into the local 
community or to repatriate. For this reason, it is 
important in planning participatory activities that 
leadership positions always have two or three backup 
people available so that a program will not be brought 
to a halt by the sudden exodus of a key leader.
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Ill CONSTRAINTS TO REFUGEE PARTICIPATION
constraints that exist, 
official constraints, e 
constraints, social con 
and managerial constraints.
1 er re fugee parti cipat ion
imp ortant to unde rstand
t . Th es e can be c 1 ass ifi
COnomi c constrai nt s , id
s tra i nts/ cross- cul tura
in ts .
A . Official Constraints
The most important barriers, and the ones most 
difficult to overcome, are those limitations placed on 
participation by the host country. These constraints 
may be in the form of written instructions (to the 
United Nations or to other assisting agencies) 
circumscribing the limits on participation, statements 
specifying what types of jobs or positions must be 
filled by host country or expatriate workers, and/or 
case-by-case limitations placed on specific sectors of 
camps or communities within the refugee population.
In other cases, official constraints may be more 
subtle but nonetheless restrictive. For example, a 
refugee administrator may simply delay making 
deci sions regarding certain programs until 
"adjustments" have been made by the assisting agency 
limiting or removing refugee participation in the 
project’s execution. In some cases, a refugee 
administrator may hold up other projects until the 
assisting agencies recognize the reason for the delay 
and quietly withdraw, phase out or cancel another 
activity which has a high degree of participation.
In extreme cases, refugee administrators have been 
known to "punish" a certain refugee community or 
assisting agency where participation has gone beyond 
the perceived or proscribed limits set out by the host 
country. An example of the latter occurred in India 
in 1971. A Bengali refugee camp operated by Oxfam was 
punished when the people became too vocal and demanded 
improvements in flood protection for the camp. The 
small 3,500 person camp was built between Calcutta’s 
Dum Dum Airport and the town of Banipur. The camp had 
been established on a low-lying, abandoned field in 
the dry season. When the rainy season began, the 
field flooded and became an uninhabitable swamp.
Water supplies became contaminated, latrines 
overflowed into living areas and cooking fires were 
almost impossible.
The refugees, prompted by social workers from Oxfam, 
organized a community group to approach the government 
and petition for a new site. When the government 
rejected their plea, the refugees organized a 
demonstration along the main highway between Calcutta
and the border. The refugees sat in the road and 
blocked traffic for several hours. Government 
soldiers disbanded the demonstration and returned the 
refugees to the camp. In retaliation for the 
refugee’s activities, food supplies were reduced to 
the bare minimum level and Oxfarn found that its 
requests for permission to conduct programs in other 
camps were consistently rejected.
Official constraints are usually a result of one of 
the following three concerns:
1. Governmental fear of losing control. A case in the 
recent relief operations in eastern Sudan 
illustrates this concern and shows how a government 
may adopt different positions for different groups.
In 1985, a visitor to the region’s refugee camps 
would be struck by the differences between the 
degree of organization in the Tigrayan and Eritrean 
camps. The Tigravans organized their camps 
according to the villages from which the people had 
come. The traditional leaders in the villages, the 
elders, maintained their positions in the camp and 
the camp was divided into geographic areas 
representing the different villages and regions of 
Tigrav. Almost every aspect of camp operations was 
turned over to the Tigrayans, and community leaders 
had a great deal of say.
In the Eritrean camps, especially those around 
Kassala, all forms of community organization were 
forbidden and people were assigned to specific 
locations in the camp according to a "space 
available" allocation system. There were no 
attempts to group families, clans or villages 
together. Sudanese authorities appointed the 
persons who would be the spokesmen for the 
refugees.
The difference between the two was a result of a 
struggle between the EPLF and the ELF which 
culminated in a shootout near the camp of Wad 
Sharife in 1984. The Sudanese government had 
generally been supportive of the ELF, the loser in 
the struggle, and feared that with the EPLF the 
dominant force, the camps could soon be turned into 
guerrilla bases. Thus, in order to maintain 
control, all forms of participatory activity were 
closed down.
2. Reservation of benefits for host country 
nationals. A major reason why participation is 
often restricted is that the host government 
insists that the economic benefits of assistance
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programs go to their own citizens rather than to 
the refugees. The United Nations and other relief 
organizations are often placed in a difficult 
position regarding this matter. Since many 
governments are openly hostile to even having the 
refugees in their country, it is often felt that a 
concession to the government to hire only host 
country nationals to work in the camps (especially 
if unemployment is high in the regions where the 
refugees are residing) will give the U.N. a better 
position in gaining admittance and asylum for the 
refugees. The result is that hundreds of jobs that 
could be filled by refugees and would increase 
their participation in camp operations are 
effectively denied them.
This issue also complicates the question of paying 
refugees for work in camps. Many relief agencies 
insist that refugees work for free or for 
additional food. In practice, however, people are 
only willing to do this for a short period of 
time. The one commodity they need most is money; 
usually voluntary work or food-for-work will only 
last for several weeks. (It’s even doubtful 
whether food-for-work programs can be initiated 
unless there is a market within the camp or the 
likelihood that people can leave the camp to sell 
extra food on a parallel market in a nearby town.)
When a government issues instructions that only 
host country nationals can be paid for work in the 
camps, the chances that the camp will operate with 
full efficiency are minimal. Often, the next step 
is for the relief agencies and the government to 
agree that leadership positions will be held by 
host country nationals but the laborers will be 
refugees. While on the surface this appears to be 
a workable agreement, the fact that leadership 
positions and decision-making are denied the 
refugees limits their participation.
Cases where these issues have been a problem 
include India (1971 Bengali refugee crisis), 
eastern Sudan ( 1984-85 ) , Mexico (current ) .
3 . Governmental fear that participation and full 
employment may create permanency, thereby 
obstructing repatriation. This sentiment is o 
expressed by countries such as Thailand which 
severely restrict activities designed to promo 





Some relief organizations cite economic reasons for 
not emphasizing early involvement of refugees in 
project planning and execution. Among the reasons 
they give are:
1. That participation, especially refugee involvement 
in paid labor activities, competes for scarce funds 
during the emergency period.
2. That costs will increase due to delays resulting 
from organizing and training refugees.
3. That refugees should provide voluntary labor rather 
than being compensated with cash. Since this dogma 
prevails, many agencies initially promote voluntary 
work or food-for-work with the result, that fewer 
and fewer people continue to work in the programs. 
While many agencies recognize that pay is a better 
incentive, they cite the lack of funds as the 
primary reason why voluntary or food-for-work 
schemes are promoted.*
C . Managerial Constraints
In practice, there are several major managerial 
obstacles to full participation by refugees. In cases 
where host governments operate the camps, there are 
few qualified community organizers who can develop 
participatory programs. While many governments have 
social workers, few have the necessary language 
capabilities or community organization experience.
More often than not, the military will be in charge of 
the camp and participatory activities run counter to 
their training and ideas about how a camp should be 
operated.
Managers often see community organization, especially 
during the emergency period, as an obstacle. In this 
case, they will often justify not organizing as an 
expediency, claiming that they should first build the 
camps and get them operating, then involve the 
refugees once things have simmered down.
D . Administration & Management
It is important that the relief agency in charge of an 
emergency operation establish refugee participation as 
part of administration and management (A&M) systems.
In large-scale emergency operations, is that agencies
*Most food for food-for-work is provided free to the relief 
agencies by AID or WFP.
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often set up effective command and control systems 
based solely on electronic communications and 
standardized reporting procedures. These systems are 
designed to give administrators ability to communicate 
and respond quickly to unforeseen contingencies but 
effectively eliminate refugee input into the 
decision-making and information-gathering process. To 
correct this, refugee administrators must establish 
effective A&M systems that assure meaningful refugee 
participation in the command and control network.
E . Social Constraints/Cross-Cultural Barriers
Since refugee camps will almost always be operated by 
host country nationals or expatriates, a number of 
social and cross-cultural barriers exist that are 
difficult to overcome. These barriers include the 
more obvious language and cultural barriers that lead 
to misunderstandings and miscommunications, but also 
problems of racism, ethno-centrism and all forms and 
degrees of discrimination. The host country may also 
harbour xenophobic fears about the refugees. In that 
environment, the government is not likely to encourage 
participatory activities.
Racism and its more subtle relation, paternalism, are 
often present in the international relief agencies 
working with refugees. Religious organizations, 
especially the evangelical groups, as well as the 
United Nations and many of the specialized disaster 
teams that work under the UNHCR, have been privately 
criticized for the poor quality of staff that they 
field in emergencies. One particular Scandinavian 
unit operating in eastern Sudan in 1985 was 
continually ostracized by other agencies for the overt 
racial slurs made by their staff about the refugees 
whom they were supporting. As one observer pointed 
out, "It’s difficult to organize the people when you 
keep calling them niggers."
Subtle paternalism is perhaps the worst obstacle to
western relief worke r s — living in
eating three square meals a day;
ate-mode 1 four-wheel- drive vehicles,
convert on the black mark et -- fall
eling of superiority and regard their
a benign and superior air. This
eds the "we know best syndrome which
st the d'evelopment of mean ingful
participation.
F . Ideological Constraints
Unfortunately, there is often a "stiff" view of 
participation. In other words, many relief agencies
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believe that participation is not a natural activity; 
rather it is something that has to be taught to the 
refugees or developed through special programs. There 
is little recognition within the relief community that 
participation is, in fact, a normal activity, 
something that people will do on their own if left 
alone. In probably one of the most absurd things to 
come out of recent relief operations, a major U.S. 
foundation gave a grant to a refugee group to study 
ways to increase its own participation in day-to-day 
refugee camp activities.
Only a few relief organizations truly understand 
refugees’ need to participate. There have been few 
comparative studies on participation and the benefits 
derived from full involvement. Therefore, there are 
few strong advocates within the relief community tor 
meaningful participation and certainly no major 
initiatives, guidelines or standard procedures have 
been developed by the U.N. system to encourage, 
promote or guarantee refugee involvement in 
emergencies. In the UNHCR Emergency Management 
Training Program carried out by the Disaster 
Management Center at the University of Wisconsin, it 
has been consistently noted that social services 
receives the least attention in training and it is the 
least focused objective. In other words, there is not 
a great deal of information about how to integrate 
refugees into the overall process; there is only a 
vague concept that it should be done.
The very nature of the relief system is a structural 
barrier to refugee participation. With only a very 
few exceptions, most agencies do not have full-time 
emergency operations specialists. When a disaster 
strikes, temporary workers are recruited for specific 
tasks and rotated at fairly frequent intervals. Few 
performance evaluations are carried out and there is 
little record of the social programs and programmatic 
approaches that have been tried. Since few 
evaluations are conducted out, there is little record 
of success or failure and, due to the high turnover of 
staff, there is little internal memory of success. It 
has been pointed out by UNHCR social service officers, 
John Williamson and Anne Dawson-Shepard that, of all 
the facets of emergency operation that are studied, 
social services and community organization receive the 
least attention. Without institutional memory, 
newcomers in the next disaster have only a limited 
view of the possibilities of refugee involvement and 
are generally unaware of the benefits that full 
participation can bring. By the time that the more 
creative staff begin to advocate fuller involvement, 
the operation is usually well into the second or third 
month (or even later).
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IV IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION
Refugee participation is important for a number of 
reasons. These include:
A . Participation Enhances Normal Coping Process
Psychological studies of disaster victims have shown 
that it is important that they be involved in 
meaningful activities as soon after they have 
experienced trauma as possible, since participation 
aids in the psychological coping process.
Psychologists have pointed out that participation:
1 . builds self-esteem;
2 . rebuilds self-confidence;
3. reduces feelings of isolation;
4. reduces lethargy, depression and despondency.
A comparative study of Bengali refugee camps in West 
Bengal was carried out in 1971. Two camps were 
compared: Salt Lake Camp in Calcutta and Bum Dum Camp 
at the edge of the Calcutta airport. At the Dum Dum 
Camp ail major activities, including camp 
construction, were carried out by paid Indian 
laborers. At the Salt Lake Camp, all activities were 
carried out by the refugees under supervision of 
Indian administrative personnel. All healthy refugees 
entering the camp were immediately assigned to 
construction details, work brigades, food service or 
other activities which were supervised by refugee 
group leaders who received their instructions from the 
camp administrators.
The Indian social workers carrying out the study 
reported to the Indian refugee administration that the 
refugees 5 ability to cope with their situation was 
significantly increased by the participatory 
activities in Salt Lake Camp. They also reported a 
significant difference in the level of psychological 
problems and anti-social behavior on the part of the 
refugees. It should be noted that Salt Lake Camp held 
approximately 250,000 at the time of the survey, while 
Dum Dum Camp held only 75,000, and environmental 
conditions were considered far worse in Salt Lake Camp 
than in Dum Dum.
(It should also be noted that despite this finding, 
the government of India continued its policy of 
refusing to allow refugees in other camps to 





, all work would be carrieddecreeing instead that all <or
by Indian contract laborer
P a r t i c i i i a M c m _ i ^ ^
, belief of many in the reliefContrary to the bei cost-effective. It is
community, participa win  almost always be
being provided free of cos
4- ] refugee participation in allortant, full ~ VT,ensive mistakes.es leads to avoidance of ^xpensi
i 3 -hard to document the speciix^would be hard to u assessment ana
havrng understood
planning, it shoul m design the
refugees help with p ffective than if they
1 will usually be mo with the societyigned by persons unfamiliar with die
ure.
C l „ . .  .... s s  f » s r s i ‘
„ d  create bog». ^  m U c  thi. ln « “usually exaggerated. assessment or
implementation stage, it is lare in
planning phases.
More imp 








c .  p . r t i d m t i o n J W t e ^ i r o t m d M
D
internal protection p r o b a n ^  
to people’s feelings °fsM uctured society as they are 
lack of belonging t _roblem. Refugee
to any other form o b values and sense of
participation helps bulJ d  ti problems. By givingcommunity that reduce protection pr over their
people a sense of w o r t h y  & community to which people 
own lives, and - • . affairs, the
feel responsible about f the community
groundwork is laid for a id*n t s . Furthermore,
which will reduce pro e rage(^  participation, more
i:en:“ eofa^ ^ i n i c ^ : n  exist b e t w e e n - - e f  u gees^
u ^ U y SbethersiePr to detect and
control.
....................  Le M B j ^ S e l f ^ u f f i i O ^
self-sufficiency,
sufficiency, is a io g ffi iency it is important
program. To hasten s e l f p l a n n i n g  and decision- 
that refugees be involved in P £ " “ "*ation is the 
making as soon as possible. Parti P
14
V .
basis of all programs leading to self-sufficiency and 
is especially important where integration into the 
host country is one of the durable solutions to be 
promoted.
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During the needs assessment process, refugee 
participation should begin at the earliest possible 
stage. Most agencies would consider that 
participation should begin as the first groups arrive 
and should try to involve the refugees in defining the 
needs of the people that are coming in. However, if 
an agency is on the ball and has anticipated the 
influx by observing the early warning signs, it may be 
possible to find people in the host country of the 
same ethnic and cultural groups as the entering 
refugees who can identify some of the needs the people 
will have and recommend appropriate measures to ensure 
early involvement of the incoming refugees.
As the refugees begin to come into the country, relief 
agencies should look for the "natural" leaders of the 
refugee community: the elders, minor elected political
leaders (such as mayors or other local officials), 
village chiefs, heads of clans, etc. Where possible, 
put these leaders on a temporary advisory council to 
help define the refugees’ needs. (Caution should be 
exercised when selecting elected leaders, those from 
political parties or military leaders from insurgent 
or liberation forces. Such leaders may be 
unacceptable to the host country and could be 
problematic. Therefore, it is more important to look 
for traditional leaders and lower-level elected 
officials.)
Once the leaders have been 
organized into several work 
committee can be used to de 
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A specific task of this group would be to identify the 
people, as they come in, who have particular skills 
that would be useful in the relief program (doctors, 
nurses, paramedical personnel, traditional healers, 
dressers, traditional birth attendants, etc., as well 
as drivers, radio technicians, accountants, etc.) A 
master list of people should be prepared and 
maintained according to previous jobs and experience.
An "origins" committee would also be helpful in needs 
assessment. This group would help identify the areas 
or regions of origin and would interview the refugees 
to determine how many more people might be coming 
out. The group would also help determine whether or 
not people could be placed in sectors of the camp 
according to the village or neighborhood of origin. 
Using the projected number of new arrivals, camp 
planners would have a good idea about how much space 
to allocate for each camp. This group is very 
important and forms the basis of establishing a remote 
detection system.
A third group that should be involved at the needs 
assessment stage is a committee to work with relief 
officials to define personal and family needs. This 
group should work with the refugees during the initial 
registration process to determine what belongings they 
have been able to bring with them and develop lists of 
the types of equipment or personal supplies they will 
require. After only a few days of these interviews, 
the group should be able to define the total package 
of assistance needed by the refugees. This group 
would also advise the camp administrators on special 
needs such as family reunification, etc. The overall 
criteria for the relief program, especially such 
aspects as the food basket, etc., can be defined by 
this group. It would be the responsibility of the 
committee to point out specific regional or ethnic 
variations among the refugee population that should be 
recognized when determining the overall assistance 
package.
The committees can provide a bridge of two-way 
communication between relief officials and the refugee 
community. Communication is an important aspect of 
the assessment process. Relief officials should use 
these committees as channels to communicate to the 
refugees the need to keep expectations within 
realistic limits.
During the needs assessment phase, any committee or 
organizational structures that are developed for
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involving the refugees should be kept as flexible as 
possible, and participants in the-process should be 
reminded constantly that entire organization is 
subject to change. It is important that the relief 
agencies not allow themselves to establish a permanent 
or inflexible structure since new arrivals may 
substantially change the social equation and other, 
more important leaders may arrive who should be 
involved in the participatory process. Also, once the 
project implementation phase is begun, other 
mechanisms for involving a wider variety of people 
must be developed.
B . Project Planning
During the project planning phase, refugee 
participation is especially important. Refugees 
should not only be involved in planning overall 
project activities (such as camp planning, developing 
the comprehensive assistance package, etc.), but also 
in planning the more specific operational projects or 
activities that will be carried out as part normal 
community activities (such as sanitation programs, 
water supply activities, etc.).
The most important reason for involving refugees at 
this stage is that it helps to avoid mistakes at the 
macro programmatic level as well as in the small, 
day-to-day details of project implementation. Had 
refugees been involved in project planning, for 
example, planners of the camps in West Bengal, India, 
would have known not to put Hindu and Moslem refugees 
in the same communities and thus could have saved 
lives that were lost when ethnic clashes flared into 
violence in the camps. In Thailand in 1979, had 
refugees been involved at an early stage, program 
planners would have recognized the need to separate 
Chinese and Vietnamese ethnics in the Sakeo Camp from 
the majority Khmer population before lives had been 
lost in the settling of scores between the two groups
Smaller mistakes can also be avoided with refugee 
participation. In 1971, foreign engineers set up 
several refugee camps in the Calcutta area and 
installed hundreds of brick-enclosed latrines with 
pour-flush toilets that emptied into septic tanks. 
Despite the fact that the latrines were kept very 
clean, they were rarely used. Only after consultation 
with the refugees was it learned that the latrines 
were built facing a sacred Banyan tree and therefore 
Hindus were prohibited by custom from using them.
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A similar incident occurred in Pakistani camps for 
Afghan refugees in;: the early 1980s. Several banks of 
latrines were built facing the southwest; Moslems 
refused to use them because they faced Mecca.
In both cases, had refugees been involved in the site 
selection, these mistakes and the cost of correcting 
them could have been avoided.
In the project planning phase, it is important to 
begin laying the groundwork for an overall refugee 
participation scheme. At this point, traditional 
leaders and community-level elected leaders should 
have been identified; from these groups, central 
leadership figures should begin to emerge. A 
committee can then be developed to work with the 
relief agencies, planning each major element of the 
assistance program, the overall assistance package, 
and camp-level activities.
In day-to-day operations, such as water and 
sanitation, technicians or skilled refugees with 
previous or similar experience in these fields can 
usually be identified and assigned leadership 
positions in planning and execution of these 
projects. Educated persons, bilingual refugees and 
others who do not hold traditional leadership 
positions can be integrated into the overall project 
structure and given important responsibilities, An 
important principle to remember is that non- 
traditional leaders, no matter how good they are, 
should always be subordinate to traditional or elected 
leaders in order to prevent a breakdown in traditional 
authority.
During the planning phase, refugees should be given as 
much real responsibility as possible, but should not 
be expected to make technical decisions that are 
beyond their level of competence. During this phase, 
refugees should usually be working in an advisory 
capacity and be full participants in the planning 
process, although ultimate decisions, especially for 
technical matters, should remain in the hands of 
technicians and the overall refugee program 
authorities. Again, relief agencies should be careful 
not to raise refugees5 expectations to unrealistic 
levels.
Examples of specific activities that can be carried 
out by refugees participating in the planning phase 
are :
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1. planning the makeup of labor forces for specific 
camp operations;
2. advising on the design and layout of refugee camps;
3. advising on the design and controls of the food 
distribution systems;
4. advising on the development of special programs for 
certain groups (elderly, unaccompanied, etc.);
5. identification and planning of special projects 
aimed at promoting self-sufficiency (gardening, 
fish ponds, etc. ) .
C . Project Execution
During the project implementation phase, participation 
should reach its maximum. At this point, almost 
everyone in a community should be involved in some 
form of participatory activity. To an extent, the 
degree of participation by each individual depends on 
the social structure of the refugees and the degree to 
which the traditional structure has been retained in 
the new refugee community.
In circumstances where a new structure has developed 
(due to the fact that the traditional structure did 
not survive intact during flight), it is especially 
important to organize people down to the lowest 
possible social unit. Refugee camps in Honduras for 
Nicaraguan refugees during the Sandinista revolution 
managed to attain a very high degree of social 
organization. One camp was subdivided into blocks and 
sections and had committees at each of these levels. 
Each shelter had a representative on the block 
committee. Each head of household participated in a 
shelter committee and elected a shelter leader. With 
this degree of organization, it was possible to 
mobi1ize large work forces for temporary activities 
and to rotate responsibility for day-to-day camp 
operations. Administrators of these camps report a 
high level of self-confidence attained by the people 
in their own ability to run the camps.
If traditional societal structures have been 
reestablished in the refugee community, participation 
(especially in relation to decisions that affect the 
whole community), should usually follow along 
traditional lines. It is important that good, 
cooperative working relationships be established and 
that adversarial relationships be avoided. Recently 
in a camp for southern Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 
the author witnessed an initial contact between a
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UNHCR field officer and a group of refugee community 
leaders. The leaders immediately began listing 
problems in the camp and demanding closer attention on 
the part of UNHCR. The field officer responded in a 
haughty manner, said that this was not the time to 
discuss such things, and notified the eiders that he 
would appoint a committee to work with him to plan 
specific projects. Since that time, relations between 
UNHCR and the refugees can best be described as a 
running battle.
In some cases , it i s impo ssibl e to ut i1ize trad i t ional
structu re s . Thi s i s espec ia11y the case wh ere the
society has unde rgone mas siVe disrupt ions , 1arg e
numbers of urban Peopl e are miXed w i th rura 1 peopl e ,
and the re have been ca tas troph ic los se s to the
f ami 1ia 1 structu res . In cases 1ike th is ( such as the
case of the Kampuchean refugees in Thailand), it may 
be important to build a new structure that enables the 
refugees to participate in overall community 
activities. Experience has shown that the best way to 
organize the people is according to the layout of the 
camp. Recent camps have been designed with social 
organization in mind.* Especially important is the 
grouping of shelters at the lowest planning level. 
Inward-facing community units like that depicted in 
Figure 1 encourage "bonding" and participation, while 
rigid grids such that depicted in Figure 2 discourage 
participation. Using the inward-facing community unit 
as a basis, innovative camp plans can be designed 
incorporating the units into blocks, blocks into 
sectors, and sectors into the overall camp.
It should be noted that, anytime traditional 
structures are left behind and a new artificial 
structure is developed, planners must be certain that 
the leaders who evolve are not obtaining power or 
their position by taking advantage of the refugees or 
relief programs. It is also important to make sure 
that armed elements within the camp do not suborn the 
camp organization to their own ends. In 1979 and 1980 
the Khmer Rouge continuously tried to use camp 
structure as a means of enforcing cadre discipline in 
the Sakeo Camp.
During project implementation, an important objective 
of increasing community participation should be to 
phase out expatriates and host country nationals as 
much as is practically and politically feasible. Once 
a camp is operating, there is no reason why the vast 
majority of activities in the camp cannot be put in
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th hands of the refugees themselves. In one of the 
East Timor- refugee camps in 1980, a group ot refugees 
successfully established a complete refugee camp, laid 
out the camp, built their own shelters, established 
their own water systems and sanitation programs, and 
carried out a food distribution program that would be 
considered a model by any western standard. The camp 
was in operation a full three months befoie an>' 
outside help arrived.
It has been noted many times that the more lefugees 
participate in a program, the more diverse will be the 
range of activities that are developed for their 
participation. In the Mesa Grande camp for Salvadoran 
refugees in Honduras, a high level of participation 
was achieved during the first year of the camp’s 
existence. Not only did people participate in a wide 
range of handicrafts, gardening, farming and other 
traditional activities; a massive poultry scheme was 
introduced along with furniture-making and other light 
manufacturing schemes.
Examples of some of the ways refugees can be involved 
in project execution include:
1. participation as both leaders and laoorers in 
day-to-day camp operations and maintenance;
2. participation as planners in schemes for camp 
upgrading and improvement;
3. participation in the development and execution of 
exile programs such as schools, adult education and 
cultural activities;
4. participation in the development and execution of 
self-help programs;
5. participation in the development and execution of 
programs designed to help make the camp moie 
self-sufficient in both food and cash income;
6. participating on the planning and execution of 
special programs for target groups within the 
community (such as women, children, the elderly, 
handicapped, etc.).
D . Project Monitoring and Evaluation
During project monitoring and evaluation, 
of accountability comes fully into play, 
there has been little monitoring and very 
evaluation; the few evaluations that have 
have generally disregarded major refugee 
often than not, evaluations have tended t
the question 






cost-efficiency questions rather than refugee 
satisfaction or ways in which refugees’ status 
be improved.. Meaningful evaluations, however, 
consider the refugees5 point of view and whethe 




Project evaluations are normally carried out by the 
international organizations or voluntary agencies 
working in the refugee communities. An increase in 
refugee participation is simply a matter of seeking 
input from the refugees and developing appropriate 
mechanisms to promote participation in the monitoring 
and evaluation activities.
Refugees can assist in monitoring camp operations. A 
committee can be asked to participate in developing 
the overall structure for monitoring, identify 
indicators to determine the relative success or 
failure of a particular program approach, determine 
user satisfaction of a particular project, and develop 
recommendations from the refugees on ways to modify or 
adjust a program to increase its workability.
This committee can also help in the ongoing monitoring 
piocess and participate in the development of any 
iepoiting formats that will be required.
Refugees can participate in evaluations into two ways, 
in planning and in carrying out the evaluation.
Again, a committee structure can be an appropriate 
means of involving the refugees. The committee can 
hilp the ©V slusi i © 1 1 Slid h@lp appropriate
questions. Once the evaluation procedure and 
instruments have been developed, the refugees 
themselves can carry out a large portion of the 
evaluation. In some cases, refugees will be much more 
elective at gathering information than outsiders, 
especially expatriates. If adequate attention is 
given to training the people in survey methods, sample 
surveys using questionnaires can be an effective 
evaluation tool.
In 1985, Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children) 
carried out an evaluation of needs for women and 
children in the war-torn areas of Guatemala. An 
outside consultant was retained to conduct the 
evaluation and develop the survey and questionnaires 
to be used to determine family needs. The consultant 
produced a draft questionnaire and then formed a 
committee of women representing households in the 
affected communities. For one week, the committee 
worked with the consultant to revise the 
questionnaire, making it more applicable to the 
situation and less threatening to the persons being
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to develop an evaluation 
major readjustment of 
developed also provided 
probably not have come
Every refugee society will have special needs that 
cannot be foreseen or that are unique to a particular 
situation. Refugee participation leads to the 
identification of these needs and can be very useful 
in the formulation of special projects to meet the 
needs. Examples of special projects include?
1* Special projects for women. These projects may be 
no more than social or work activities but can also 
include projects designed to help women that have 
experienced special personal trauma such as the 
loss of children, women who have been physically 
abused or raped, and women who have special 
physiological or health needs.
2. Coping programs. Special programs are often 
designed to help people cope with their 
circumstances. An example would be childrens’ 
houses, such as those set up by relief agencies in 
Kampuchean refugee camps in 1979. One of the most 
innovative programs that this author has seen was 
an arts program started in 1969 to help Biafran 
children cope with their experiences by getting 
them to draw or paint scenes from their life. 
Expatriate observers were horrified by the 
drawings, which often depicted massacres, people 
being burned alive, etc. But for the children, the 
ability to express these things and get them out in 
the open played a vital part in the coping 
process. The project was originated by social 
workers from the refugee community and has since 
been copied by many relief agencies in other parts 
of the world.
3. Return Training. An innovative project was 
designed in 1985 to help prepare Tigrayans to 
return to their villages with enhanced skills.
This approach was used in eastern Sudan in 1985 in 
the Sefawa camp. First, the refugees were assigned 
to sectors of the camp according to their original 
villages. Next, workers were identified and 
trained to work in the camp doing activities and 
learning skills that would be useful to their 
community once they returned. The objective was to 
provide skills that were not already there. For
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example, women were trained to be nutrition 
extensionists and to promote better nutriti 
ractices. Traditional healers and birt 
-tendants were identified and brought into the SCF 
i to receive special training to improve
their-skills, reduce infection, and carry out then 
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